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POLICING AND “BLUELINING” 
Aya Gruber 
ABSTRACT 
In this Commentary written for the Frankel Lecture 
symposium on police killings of Black Americans, I explore the 
increasingly popular claim that racialized brutality is not a 
malfunction of policing but its function. Or, as Paul Butler 
counsels, “Don’t get it twisted—the criminal justice system ain’t 
broke. It’s working just the way it’s supposed to.” This claim 
contradicts the conventional narrative, which remains largely 
accepted, that the police exist to vindicate the community’s 
interest in solving, reducing, and preventing crime. A perusal of 
the history of organized policing in the United States, however, 
reveals that it was never mainly about interdicting crime. From 
its inception in the nineteenth century, organized policing served 
the social, political, and economic priorities of empowered groups, 
from supporting Southern agrarian capitalist interests by 
imposing de facto slavery on emancipated Blacks to bolstering 
Northern industrialization by oppressing immigrant laborers. 
Afterward, police forces grew in response not to spikes in garden-
variety crimes but to political campaigns and cultural anxieties. 
And today, it remains contested whether current policing 
practices—especially street policing—function to alleviate, rather 
than exacerbate, crime problems. 
 
  Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. I give a heartfelt thank you 
to my dear friends, Frankel Lecturer Angela Onwuachi-Willig and co-respondent Dean 
Tamara Lawson. I am also grateful to the organizers of the Lecture, in particular Priyanka 
Kasnavia and Erin Horan Mendez, and the Houston Law Review editors. Peter Selimos and 
Ariane Frosh provided excellent research assistance. 
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While policing’s crime-reduction success is questionable, one 
obvious, tremendous success has been its control of race, space, 
and place. Police draw blue lines around Black neighborhoods—
just as banks drew their red lines—designating them as high-risk, 
pathological spaces. Police use aggressive stop and frisks, intense 
surveillance, and military-style home raids to keep the people in 
their spatial and social place. Brutality is the business of policing, 
reinforced in recruitment, training, and practice. I conclude that 
because racialized brutality is integral to policing, reformers 
should not primarily focus on incarcerating specific bad cops who 
draw headlines. The “bad apple” narrative casts racist violence as 
individual and deviant, rather than institutional and structural, 
and undermines the current promising, if glacial, movement 
toward dismantling policing as we know it. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
We are in the midst of a sea change. 
During the summer of 2020, millions of people around the 
world took to the streets to express their outrage at the horrific 
police killings of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, Daniel Prude, and 
too many others. People watched aghast as the militarized police 
and federal paramilitaries trained their weapons of war on 
peaceful protesters and disappeared civilians in a manner more 
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befitting a dictatorship than the United States.1 Progressives were 
dismayed that police and prosecutors continued to fill overcrowded 
and unsanitary prisons where COVID-19 raged, thereby imposing 
an unofficial death penalty on thousands of detainees, many of 
whom had not yet been tried for misdemeanors. 2  All this 
galvanized a shift in mindset, and no longer did people regard 
these events as disconnected points of pain. Rather, they stepped 
back, and Seurat-like, a picture emerged with each point a 
component of our intolerable system of racialized mass 
incarceration.3 
In the past, most commentators characterized police brutality 
as a matter of individual racist and sadistic bad cops, and many 
still do.4 Progressive carceral critics, including criminologists and 
law professors, have accordingly advocated for modest procedural 
reforms of policing and the penal system.5 But today, an increasing 
number of experts argue that changes at the margins that leave 
untouched the oppressive structure of policing and punishment, 
such as body cameras, implicit bias training, and data-driven 
practices, are simply not enough. In fact, ineffective and marginal 
reforms can bolster policing institutions by accruing to them 
 
 1. See Benjamin Fearnow, Pelosi Calls Out Trump Admin Over Portland Unrest: ‘We 
Live in a Democracy, Not a Banana Republic,’ NEWSWEEK (July 19, 2020, 10:02 AM), https:// 
www.newsweek.com/pelosi-calls-out-trump-admin-over-portland-unrest-we-live-democrac 
y-not-banana-republic-1518902 [https://perma.cc/8VDE-JNAP]. 
 2. Katie Park & Tom Meagher, A State-by-State Look at Coronavirus in Prisons, 
MARSHALL PROJECT, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/01/a-state-by-state-look-
at-coronavirus-in-prisons [https://perma.cc/ME5A-J9EJ] (Apr. 9, 2021, 5:30 PM); Timothy 
Williams et al., ‘Jails Are Petri Dishes’: Inmates Freed as the Virus Spreads Behind Bars, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/30/us/coronavirus-prisons-ja 
ils.html [https://perma.cc/ZP6Q-UZ4Z]; see Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass 
Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.p 
risonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/2UDM-SQDC]; Michael Lyle, ‘No 
Outrage. No Concern. No Action. Just More Silence.’, NEV. CURRENT (Nov. 20, 2020), https:// 
www.nevadacurrent.com/2020/11/20/no-outrage-no-concern-no-action-just-more-silence/ [h 
ttps://perma.cc/HD9M-F9PQ]. 
 3. See generally David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 27, 28–29, 33–34, 46, 50 (2011). 
 4. See Kate Levine, Police Prosecutions and Punitive Instincts, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 49–50) (on file with author) (describing the agenda to 
prosecute police and how it communicates that brutality is an individual act of deviance). 
Such narratives are consistent with liberal mainstream views of racial discrimination. See 
KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW ET AL., CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED 
THE MOVEMENT, at xiii, xv (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (“Along with the 
suppression of explicit white racism (the widely celebrated aim of civil rights reform), the 
dominant legal conception of racism as a discrete and identifiable act of ‘prejudice based on 
skin color’ . . . .”). 
 5. See NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON 
AMERICA 3–4 (2014); infra Part IV (criticizing this tinkering from within). 
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money and thwarting more substantial interventions.6 After the 
events of the summer, many Black Lives Matter protesters and 
others came to see the criminal system’s tendency to wound, 
control, and thus maintain the subordinate status of people of 
color, not as a malfunction but as the system’s function.7 
In this essay, I have the fortunate task of responding to Dean 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig’s Frankel Lecture, From “Lynching as 
Status Quo” to the New Status Quo. I am delighted to engage the 
work of my friend and colleague, who is a luminary in the field of 
racial justice. Onwuachi-Willig persuasively illustrates a pattern 
of injustice that has been on repeat play with tragic regularity 
from the days of Jim Crow and before, involving state and societal 
tolerance for racist violence. Drawing on the theory of cultural 
trauma developed by sociologist Kai Erickson, 8  she heart-
wrenchingly describes how Black Americans experience intense, 
long-lasting, and damaging pain and trauma caused by repeatedly 
viewing state actors ignore, tolerate, and glorify state and quasi-
state brutality against Black people. Dean Onwuachi-Willig 
illustrates in exacting detail how the brutal Emmett Till and 
Trayvon Martin killings, separated by over a half-century, both 
clearly reflect this recurring pattern of injustice.9 
I agree with Dean Onwuachi-Willig’s analysis about the 
ubiquity and depth of racial inequality in society generally and in 
policing particularly. We agree that many White communities 
take pains to maintain homogenous racial spaces by using private 
patrollers like George Zimmerman and official police patrols, and 
exclusionary economic and social practices.10  We agree that 
implicit and explicit biases, personal frames of reference, and 
cultural mythologies render many people blindly trusting of law 
 
 6. See infra Part IV. 
 7. See infra Part III; Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice 
Reform, 117 MICH. L. REV. 259, 273, 310 (2018) (“[Contemporary ideological left criticism] 
raises questions about all aspects of the criminal system and the political economy in which 
it is embedded. It sounds not in the language of small-bore solutions or narrow, pragmatic 
fixes, but in terms of sweeping systemic critique.”). 
 8. KAI T. ERIKSON, EVERYTHING IN ITS PATH: DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY IN THE 
BUFFALO CREEK FLOOD 11–12, 136 (1976). 
 9. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Trauma of Awakening to Racism: Did the Tragic 
Killing of George Floyd Result in Cultural Trauma for Whites?, 58 HOUS. L. REV. 817, 829–
830, 835–36 (2021); see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Trauma of the Routine: Lessons 
on Cultural Trauma from the Emmett Till Verdict, 34 SOCIO. THEORY 335, 353 (2016) 
[hereinafter Onwuachi-Willig, Trauma of the Routine]. 
 10. See infra Section III.A; Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Policing the Boundaries of 
Whiteness: The Tragedy of Being “Out of Place” from Emmett Till to Trayvon Martin, 102 
IOWA L. REV. 1113, 1181–82 (2017). 
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enforcement and skeptical of Black innocence. We agree that the 
George Floyd protests may have been a tipping point for a number 
of White Americans, and the newfound convergence against racist 
police brutality might portend a better future. However, 
Onwuachi-Willig, like many racial justice seekers, emphasizes the 
need to hold individual police and private actors accountable 
through criminal prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment.11 To 
be sure, for many years, most Americans,12  including Black 
Americans, have understood justice as the incarceration of 
individuals deemed responsible for harm, even if that 
incarceration is within our racist, overbroad, and inhumane mass 
imprisonment system.13 
However, racialized police violence is but one facet of an 
American carceral state preoccupied with inflicting pain on Black 
and Brown bodies. Policing is the legacy of Reconstruction-era 
penal policies critical to the oppression of formerly enslaved Black 
Americans.14  Policing and the punishment system are primary 
mechanisms by which the government and powerful private actors 
socially control the masses, perpetuate White supremacy, and 
maintain the minimal size of the welfare state.15 As such, the cycle 
of racist police violence and state toleration identified by 
Onwuachi-Willig is not a miscalibration of the carceral system but 
endemic to it.16 And diverting more resources to that very system 
in exchange for the prosecution of select racist and murderous 
officers—a costly bargain—is unlikely to break the cycle.17 
Racialized police violence is both institutional and structural. 
I use the term “institutional” to denote that from the very 
inception of organized American law enforcement, racialized and 
classed social control was an essential part of what it means to 
 
 11.  See Onwuachi-Willig, Trauma of the Routine, supra note 9, at 353. 
 12. I use “American” colloquially, referring to people that reside in the United States 
either permanently or for a significant period of time. 
 13. See Aya Gruber, Race to Incarcerate: Punitive Impulse and the Bid to Repeal 
Stand Your Ground, 68 U. MIA. L. REV. 961, 966–67 (2014) [hereinafter Race to Incarcerate] 
(describing a “punitive impulse, deeply entrenched in the American psyche, that leads even 
left-leaning racial justice proponents occasionally to hastily embrace proposals that 
augment the very police and prosecutorial power they otherwise criticize”). 
 14. See infra Section II.A. 
 15. See infra Section II.B. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See infra Part IV; Levine, supra note 4 (manuscript at 55) (discussing the broader 
carceral impacts of the cop-prosecution program). 
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“police.”18 Of course, we might imagine a brigade of friendly, race-
neutral, nonviolent service providers—something like the Red 
Cross—but such a vision is distinctly not one of policing. I use the 
term “structural” to denote that racial inequality and brutal 
violence are embedded in and reinforced by the organization, 
training, and accepted practices of the police and their supporting 
criminal law actors. 19  This structural analysis stands in 
counterdistinction to the common refrain that police brutality is 
the product of “bad apples” or good apples who “chok[ed],” as 
President Trump put it.20 Given the institutional and structural 
nature of racialized police violence, I question whether Black Lives 
Matter and other police-critical movements’ discourse and 
activism should elevate the conviction of killer cops as the highest 
form of racial redress.21 
There is a reason some police chiefs, prosecutors, and 
conservative politicians have gone on the record to vociferously 
condemn officers in high-profile brutality cases. That narrative 
affirms that police violence is a product of the rare, intentionally 
racist and murderous bad cop and not of the institution of policing 
and its entrenched structures. Indeed, the police killing anyone, 
especially an unarmed civilian, is statistically rare. 22  But the 
regular violence and everyday indignity officers disproportionately 
exact on minorities—and plenty of marginalized white people—
are not. Interest-convergence theory and history predict that 
reformers will find it far easier to succeed with an agenda of 
empowering prosecutors to convict a few murderous cops than 
with one of dismantling policing as we know it.23 
 
 18. See infra Section II.A.; Aya Gruber, Murder, Minority Victims, and Mercy, 85 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 129, 135 (2014) [hereinafter Murder, Minority Victims, & Mercy] (describing 
how an “institutional” view of the American death penalty and substantive homicide law 
as institutions of racial domination cuts against efforts to equalize them from within). 
 19. See infra Section III.B; Barbara E. Armacost, Police Shootings: Is Accountability 
the Enemy of Prevention?, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 907, 960–61 (2019); Seth Stoughton, Law 
Enforcement’s “Warrior” Problem, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 225, 225–28 (2015). 
 20. ‘It’s Called Choking’: Donald Trump Blames Racist Policing on ‘Bad Apples,’ 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 2, 2020, 3:37 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2020/sep/ 
02/its-called-choking-donald-trump-blames-racist-policing-on-bad-apples-video [https://per 
ma.cc/PJ8H-MXER]. 
 21. See Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of 
Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1438 (2016) (“In Ferguson . . . people allied 
with the Movement for Black Lives were among the strongest voices for prosecution of 
Officer Wilson . . . .”). 
 22. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, WHEN POLICE KILL 158 (2017). 
 23. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980); DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. 
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I begin this Commentary by disputing a narrative so 
entrenched in the American mindset it is rarely questioned—that 
the purpose of policing is to fight crime. I then proceed to examine 
what the institution of policing has actually proven it is wildly 
effective at achieving. It has succeeded spectacularly at what I call 
“bluelining,” that is, maintaining raced and classed spatial and 
social segregation through the threat and application of violence. 
As such, racialized brutality is foundational to the structure of 
organized policing and it is manifested programmatically in 
everything from recruiting to training and best practices. Finally, 
I will conclude by cautioning that, given the institutional and 
structural nature of racialized police violence and the inherent 
limitations and internal pathologies of criminal prosecution, the 
cop-prosecution program holds little promise of creating a more 
just system. 
II. THE “PURPOSE” OF POLICING 
Policing is in a perpetual state of repair. Every day there is a 
new proposal for how police departments can finally provide safety 
and services without terrorizing marginalized communities and 
playing judge, jury, and executioner to those suspected of crimes. 
From body cameras to debiasing and deescalation training, there 
are a plethora of progressive law and policy reforms intended to 
control certain officers’ racist and violent tendencies so that police 
can better “do their jobs.”24 What has been strikingly absent from 
the mainstream policing literature is the contention that police 
officers who engage in racialized violence are doing their jobs. 
The conventional narrative, even among reformers, has long 
been that the police primarily exist to vindicate the community’s 
interest in solving, reducing, and preventing crime.25 In this view, 
 
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 49 (2004) 
(discussing interest convergence). 
 24. See Daniel M. Blumberg et al., New Directions in Police Academy Training: A Call 
to Action, INT’L J. ENV’T RSCH. & PUB. HEALTH 7 (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.mdpi.com/1660-
4601/16/24/4941/pdf [https://perma.cc/6KXD-NKNZ]; Brett Chapman, Body-Worn 
Cameras: What the Evidence Tells Us, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Nov. 14, 2018), https://nij.ojp.gov/t 
opics/articles/body-worn-cameras-what-evidence-tells-us [https://perma.cc/FBH3-B6XV]. 
See generally Brittain McClurg, Comment, Reducing the Impact of Racial Discrimination 
in Policing, 2019 J. DISP. RESOL., no.1, at 201, 216 (2019). 
 25. See ALEX S. VITALE, THE END OF POLICING 31 (2018) (“The police exist to keep us 
safe, or so we are told by mainstream media and popular culture.”). 
Traditional writing regarding the police function does not view the police as an 
instrument of the state conceived to protect the interests of the few at the expense 
of the many. On the contrary, police in both England and the United States are 
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all the other social arrangements policing has created and 
maintained are the fortuitous, unintended, and unimportant 
consequences of the police fulfilling their democratic crime-control 
function within an as yet unequal society. This presumption is 
reflected in the simplistic and misleading claim that urban 
communities of color are inundated with street policing because 
they have more crime, which law enforcement officers are sworn 
to fight.26 
However, it is evident that the designation of what is and is 
not crime; which crimes within overbroad penal codes are enforced 
or tolerated; and who, when, and where enforcement takes place 
are not the products of democratic community input. Political 
priorities and police practices, from the Black Codes of old to the 
stop-and-frisk practices of today, make clear that crimes and 
criminal enforcement have never stemmed from a neutral 
overlapping consensus about community need. Nevertheless, as 
anthropologists Cyril Robinson and Richard Scaglion observe, 
“The idea that the police really issue from the community and are 
a part of that community has been a pervasive and essential prop 
to concepts of modern policing.”27 It is time to lose the prop. 
A. Policing Did Not Originate to Fight Crime 
The notion that policing is about interdicting crime—or, more 
specifically, the conduct everyone agrees is criminal (i.e., 
burglary)—has been remarkably long-lived and intractable, 
despite the dearth of evidence that American policing was ever 
mainly about crime control. Historians are in fair agreement that 
organized police forces began to emerge in the early nineteenth 
century and became the norm by the Progressive Era.28 Just as all 
 
generally seen as protectors of the law and order that allow democratic 
institutions to operate. 
Cyril D. Robinson & Richard Scaglion, The Origin and Evolution of the Police Function in 
Society: Notes Toward a Theory, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 109, 114 (1987). 
 26. See infra Section III.A; RUTH D. PETERSON & LAUREN J. KRIVO, DIVERGENT 
SOCIAL WORLDS: NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME AND THE RACIAL-SPATIAL DIVIDE 5 (2010) (“[A] 
critical and nearly unbridgeable racial-spatial divide in social contexts pervades the United 
States and sets the stage for ethno-racial inequality in crime.”). 
 27. Robinson & Scaglion, supra note 25, at 114. 
 28. See SAMUEL WALKER & CHARLES M. KATZ, THE POLICE IN AMERICA: AN 
INTRODUCTION 29 (8th ed. 2013) (noting that after the creation of the first modern police 
force in the 1830s, “Americans moved very slowly in creating new police forces”); Gary 
Potter, The History of Policing in the United States, Part 1, E. KY. UNIV. ONLINE: POLICE 
STUD. (June 25, 2013), https://plsonline.eku.edu/insidelook/history-policing-united-states-
part-1 [https://perma.cc/V83F-XAT5] (tracing the earliest police departments to the 1830s 
and finding that most major cities had police departments by the 1880s). 
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politics is local, the history of policing in the United States is 
heterodox, reflecting the social, racial, and economic conditions of 
the particular places where and the particular times when the 
forces formed. There are even competing historical accounts of 
what drove the federal government to organize a national police 
force, from the need to control interstate vice to the need to patrol 
the interstate.29 
The development of state and local police forces is also not a 
uniform story, but rather hundreds of local stories, each with their 
own lesson. Nevertheless, there is a strikingly consistent feature 
of policing origin stories—they have little to do with crime. For 
example, throughout the South, the creation of organized police 
forces was a crucial part of states’ and society’s project of 
maintaining post-war White social and economic supremacy. After 
the Civil War, legislation in the form of “Black Codes” replaced 
enslavement as the legal construct that maintained Blacks in a 
subjugated status.30  The Codes, with their broad and vague 
definitions of vagrancy, made emancipated people perpetually 
criminal, subject at any time to state control, detention, and 
management. Legal scholar Gary Stewart describes the structure 
of Mississippi’s Black Codes: 
As the first state to pass and implement its set of Black 
Codes, Mississippi enacted legislation designed to keep black 
people in their rightful place—that is, on the plantation. One 
of the most controversial sections of Mississippi’s Black Code 
defined “vagrant[s]” as “runaways, drunkards, pilferers; 
lewd, wanton, or lascivious persons, in speech or behavior; 
those who neglect their employment, misspend their 
earnings, and fail to support their families; and ‘all other idle 
and disorderly persons.’” The statute also regulated white 
behavior that threatened the existing social order. Thus, a 
second group of vagrants included idle blacks and “white 
 
 29. Compare JESSICA R. PLILEY, POLICING SEXUALITY: THE MANN ACT AND THE 
MAKING OF THE FBI 134–35 (2014) (controlling interstate vice), with SARAH A. SEO, 
POLICING THE OPEN ROAD: HOW CARS TRANSFORMED AMERICAN FREEDOM 52–53 (2019) 
(patrolling the interstate). 
 30. See Gary Stewart, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial 
Hegemony in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249, 2257–59 (1998); Sandra 
Bass, Policing Space, Policing Race: Social Control Imperatives and Police Discretionary 
Decisions, 28 SOC. JUST., Spring 2001, at 156, 160; William Cohen, Negro Involuntary 
Servitude in the South, 1865–1940: A Preliminary Analysis, 42 J.S. HIST. 31, 33–34, 51 
(1976); Hubert Williams & Patrick V. Murphy, The Evolving Strategy of Police: A Minority 
View, in PERSPECTIVES ON POLICING, at 1, 6 (Nat’l Inst. for Just., No. 13, Jan. 1990). See 
generally SALLY E. HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS: LAW AND VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA AND THE 
CAROLINAS 198–200 (2001). 
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persons associating with them ‘on terms of equality’ or guilty 
of sexual relations with them.” The Act also authorized local 
officials to impose a special poll tax on blacks aged eighteen 
to sixty, the proceeds of which would be collected for a 
“Freedman’s Pauper Fund.” Failure to pay this tax 
constituted “prima facie evidence of vagrancy.”31 
These vagrancy laws were facially neutral—indeed, some 
lawmakers characterized them as intended to protect the 
emancipated—but when enforced by the newly formed Southern 
police, they were indistinguishable from the prewar slave patrol 
regime.32  Historian Sally Hadden observes that after the Civil 
War, “policemen in Southern towns continued to carry out those 
aspects of urban slave patrolling that seemed race-neutral but 
that in reality were applied selectively. Police saw that nightly 
curfews and vagrancy laws kept blacks off city streets, just as 
patrollers had done in the colonial and antebellum eras.”33 
Like slavery itself, the postslavery legal and law enforcement 
regime served the ends of both White racial supremacy and 
exploitative agrarian capitalism. Historian Larry Spruill recounts 
an 1865 column from the editor of the Lynchburg Virginian stating 
that “stringent police regulations may be necessary to keep 
[freedmen] from overburdening the towns and depleting the 
agricultural regions of labor.” 34  States required an organized 
enforcement apparatus to ensure that these newly developed and 
broadened vagrancy laws would fulfill their goal of recapturing 
Black physical labor and imposition of enslavement by another 
name. States organized police forces, which often simply 
reconstituted preexisting slave-patrol and slave-hunter groups. 
These early police departments enforced the Black Codes 
selectively at the behest of plantation owners. This selective—and 
brutal—policing was critical to maintaining the racial capitalist 
 
 31. Stewart, supra note 30, at 2260–61 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). 
 32. William Cohen remarks: 
Broadly drawn vagrancy statutes enabled police to round up idle blacks in times 
of labor scarcity and also gave employers a coercive tool that might be used to 
keep workers on the job. Those jailed on charges of vagrancy or any other petty 
crime were then vulnerable to the operations of the criminal-surety system, 
which gave the offender an “opportunity” to sign a voluntary labor contract with 
his former employer or some other white who agreed to post bond. 
Cohen, supra note 30, at 33–34. 
 33. HADDEN, supra note 30, at 219. 
 34. Larry H. Spruill, Slave Patrols, “Packs of Negro Dogs” and Policing Black 
Communities, 53 PHYLON, Summer 2016, at 42, 59. 
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order built on the backs of enslaved Black people. Historian 
William Cohen describes the operation in detail: 
At harvest time cotton farms experienced an acute need for 
a large work force, and it was precisely at such times that 
the police became most active in discovering vagrants. In 
September 1901 a number of Mississippi towns rounded up 
“idlers and vagrants” and drove them “into the cotton fields 
where the farmers are crying for labor to pick the season’s 
crop.” . . . So common were such practices that the Atlanta 
Constitution could quip to the police: “Cotton is ripening. See 
that the ‘vags’ get busy.” Local officials at all levels endorsed 
such tactics, and in 1910 a Memphis police-court judge 
announced a new policy whereby blacks brought before him 
on vagrancy charges would be allowed “to go free provided 
they would accept jobs offered by farmers who have set up a 
cry over scarcity of ‘hands’.” Warmly endorsed by the mayor 
and police commissioner, this plan was accompanied by the 
announcement that the police would “renew their efforts to 
clear the city of all vagrants and loiterers.”35 
In the North, societies and economies were not reliant on the 
unique institution of agrarian capitalism enabled by race-based 
enslavement. Nevertheless, organized policing’s origin story in 
Northern industrial communities runs parallel to the Southern 
Reconstruction story. Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century Northern urban areas were characterized by rapid 
industrialization and large influxes of European immigrant 
groups. Just as Southern police forces maintained racial and 
economic inequality, Northern police forces coalesced to protect 
the interests of wealthy manufacturing barons and maintain 
White-American dominance over workers, often recent 
immigrants considered to be ethnic inferiors.36 
The organization of policing in Buffalo, New York, at the turn 
of the century is described in detail by sociologists Sidney Harring 
and Lorraine McMullin in their 1975 article The Buffalo Police 
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1872–1900.37  After the Civil War, Buffalo experienced rapid 
economic growth due to industrialization and population growth 
due to a wave of Polish migrants. The Polish immigrants made up 
the majority of unskilled workers, and they “were crowded into a 
small section of the East Side and scattered in other undesirable 
living areas along the waterfront, around factories and near 
stockyards where they lived with little income in generally 
deplorable conditions.”38 During this time—from the first statute 
organizing an official police force in 1871 to 1900—the Buffalo 
Police Department also grew precipitously.39 But, “[t]he growth of 
the Buffalo force had no direct relationship to either the growth of 
the population or to an increase in crime.”40 The question becomes: 
What accounted for the creation and proliferation of organized 
policing in Buffalo? 
Organized policing in Buffalo came into existence for a very 
specific purpose: to serve “the wealthiest business interests in 
Buffalo [who] exercised direct control over the police 
department.”41 These business magnates regularly occupied the 
police infrastructure’s upper echelons, including mayor, police 
commissioner, and many of the superintendents. Harring and 
McMullin observe, “During the period under consideration 
virtually every major business interest in Buffalo was represented 
among the Police Commissioners at one time or another. . . . All 
major and many extremely minor decisions affecting the police 
were made by the two commissioners.”42 
The police, however, did not just exercise control 
idiosyncratically in response to the business interests of the day. 
Their overarching role in Buffalo was clear and programmatic: 
they existed to quash “disorder,” namely, the disorder of 
immigrant laborers agitating for workers’ rights. Harring and 
McMullin explain: 
In Buffalo (1872-1900) this “disorder” was based almost 
entirely on disputes between business owners and workers 
over wages and working conditions. Behind these disputes 
are political questions dealing with fundamental 
 
 37. Sidney L. Harring & Lorraine M. McMullin, The Buffalo Police 1872–1900: Labor 
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 38. Id. at 5–6. 
 39. Id. at 7. 
 40. Id. 
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relationships of power and wealth, ownership and control. 
The problem of controlling the large dissatisfied working 
class became the major impetus to the development of the 
Buffalo police force during the years Buffalo was developing 
its industry.43 
The “disorder” to which the Buffalo police responded with 
particular viciousness was primarily not violent strikes. Rather: 
The normal procedure was a large police reaction at the first 
“reports” of possible strike. It was not unusual for the entire 
force to be ordered on duty at the moment the strike was 
declared and to remain on duty continuously until the strike 
ended—even if it was over a month and no violence 
occurred.44 
Buffalo police used violence and the threat of violence to break 
strikes, break up workers’ meetings, and prevent working-class 
people from political assembly by “blocking entrances [to halls], 
and by arresting street-corner speakers.” Like Southern police’s 
enforcement of Black Codes, Northern police used “[o]ffenses such 
as disorderly conduct, vagrancy, tramp, drunkenness . . . to 
control any group of working class people.”45 
Consequently, the historical antecedents of specific police 
departments may be heterodox and dependent on geographic and 
temporal conditions, but one thing is abundantly clear: the early 
development and proliferation of organized police forces was never 
about ordinary crime. It was always about the social, political, and 
economic priorities of an empowered group. Whether policing’s 
purpose was to impose de facto slavery on emancipated Blacks in 
the South, control immigrant laborers in the North, exclude Asian 
immigrants in the West, or enforce moral purity regimes 
nationally, it was decidedly not about responding to increases in 
garden-variety thefts, murders, burglaries, and the like.46 In fact, 
in the South, police forces were clear that the epidemic of murders 
of Black people was simply not a police issue.47 This history sounds 
in the present, according to criminologists Hubert Williams and 
Patrick Murphy: 
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The fact that the legal order not only countenanced but 
sustained slavery, segregation, and discrimination for most 
of our Nation’s history—and the fact that the police were 
bound to uphold that order—set a pattern for police behavior 
and attitudes toward minority communities that has 
persisted until the present day. That pattern includes the 
idea that minorities have fewer civil rights, that the task of 
the police is to keep them under control, and that the police 
have little responsibility for protecting them from crime 
within their communities.48 
Today, policing scholars like Tracey Meares acknowledge “the 
racialized origins of policing in America—from its roots in 
nineteenth-century slave patrols to its build-up during the early 
twentieth century as an immigrant-control brigade.”49 
B. Policing Did Not Proliferate to Fight Crime 
As much as the creation of police departments had nothing to 
do with crime, their expansions were rarely direct reactions to 
crime spikes. The early Buffalo Police Department, for example, 
grew at a rate that outpaced population growth during a time of 
declining crime rates.50 That police department growth, as noted 
above, was overtly political, racial, and economic, reflecting 
industrialists’ desire to control the immigrant labor force and 
quash their burgeoning socialist ideals. There is a similar 
contemporary story in which state and local law enforcement’s 
precipitous growth in the past several decades had more to do with 
political fortunes than spiking crime rates. 
“Nationwide data on municipal expenditures and crime rates 
from 1990 to 2017” reveals that cities’ crime rates “precipitously 
declined, while [their] expenditures on policing significantly 
increased.”51 To be more specific, in 1990 there were on average 
“12 violent crimes per 1,000 people, and cities spent an average of 
$182 (in today’s dollars) per resident on the police.”52 
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Compare this to 2017, . . . [in which] [t]he violent crime rate 
had decreased by 56% to five crimes per 1,000, but 
the . . . police budget had increased by 59%, to $292 per 
resident. Across the 1,088 largest municipalities in the U.S., 
that change amounted to an aggregate police budget increase 
of over $17 billion per year. [In the same period], cities’ 
average allocation of funds to health care and public 
assistance increased by a modest 5–10%. Spending on 
housing and community development did not increase at 
all.53 
As was the case with turn-of-the-century Buffalo, the increases in 
city police budgets from the 1990s to today reflect larger political, 
racial, and economic hierarchies. Many thoughtful scholars have 
offered insights into the influence of late twentieth-century 
American political and economic ideology on law enforcement 
policies. Each of those writings merits its own essay.54 But for the 
purposes of this Commentary, I offer a nutshell version of this 
socio-legal history. In 1968, Richard Nixon, who was campaigning 
for president, embraced a strategy of centering law enforcement in 
his political platform. At that time, 81% of Harris poll respondents 
agreed that “Law and Order has broken down in this country,” a 
majority of whom blamed “Negroes” and “Communists.”55 Nixon 
capitalized on social anxieties about scruffy hippies and hostile 
Blacks fomenting civil unrest and ran a campaign ad pledging to 
protect law-abiding citizens from such “domestic violence.”56 He 
reportedly later remarked of the ad, “It’s all about those damn 
Negro-Puerto Rican groups out there.”57 Nixon deftly employed 
the so-called “Southern Strategy,” developed during the 1964 
Barry Goldwater presidential campaign, which used dog-whistle 
racist crime rhetoric to court Dixiecrats to the Republican Party.58 
 
 53. Id.; see also Monica C. Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 650, 761 
(2020) (“In economically depressed cities where virtually all other services are defunded, 
police departments are often one of few entities that remain, usually in weakened form.”). 
 54. E.g., JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 157, 164 (2007); DAVID 
GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 91–93 (2001); LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR 
64–67 (George Steinmetz & Julia Adams eds., Duke Univ. Press 2009) (2004); MARIE 
GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS 20, 31 (2006). 
 55. Dennis D. Loo & Ruth-Ellen M. Grimes, Polls, Politics, and Crime: The “Law and 
Order” Issue of the 1960s, 5 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 50, 59–60 (2004). 
 56. Scott Laderman, How Richard Nixon Captured White Rage—and Laid the 
Groundwork for Donald Trump, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingt 
onpost.com/outlook/2019/11/03/how-richard-nixon-captured-white-rage-laid-groundwork-d 
onald-trump/ [https://perma.cc/GSG6-E54J]. 
 57. Id. 
 58. ANGIE MAXWELL & TODD SHIELDS, THE LONG SOUTHERN STRATEGY 37 (2019). 
58 HOUS. L. REV. 867 (2021) 
882 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [58:4 
President Ronald Reagan picked up on this strategy in the 
’80s and notably also used the crime issue to sell his radical 
deregulatory and anti-welfare economic program, often 
shorthanded by scholars as “neoliberalism.” Reagan vowed to—
and did—gut government aid programs, deregulate banks and the 
market, cut taxes, and end labor and trade protections.59  As 
President Obama remarked in 2008, “Ronald Reagan changed the 
trajectory of America . . . .”60 Since the “Reagan Revolution,” the 
wealth gap has widened into a chasm.61 According to economists, 
between 1980 and 2014, “eight points of national income 
transferred from the bottom 50% to the top 1%. The top 1% income 
share is now [in 2014] almost twice as large as the bottom 50% 
share, a group that is by definition 50 times more numerous.”62 
This reverse-Robin Hood program has endured. On October 30, 
2020, Bloomberg News reported that during President Trump’s 
term, billionaires’ accumulated wealth increased by thirty percent, 
amounting to an “increase[] [in] their combined wealth by a 
staggering $1 trillion.”63 
Reagan and his allies’ ideology was tailor-made for the one 
percent, but they were able to sell it to the other ninety-nine by 
portraying the poor as responsible for their plights and recasting 
the problems of poverty as products of criminality. Reagan drew a 
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straight line from liberals’ social welfare ideology to the pressing 
crime problem: 
Individual wrongdoing, they told us, was always caused by a 
lack of material goods, and underprivileged background, or 
poor socioeconomic conditions. And somehow . . . it was 
society, not the individual, that was at fault when an act of 
violence or a crime was committed. Somehow, it wasn’t the 
wrongdoer but all of us who were to blame. Is it any wonder, 
then, that a new privileged class emerged in America, a class 
of repeat offenders and career criminals who thought they 
had the right to victimize their fellow citizens with 
impunity[?]64 
The rhetorical move is brilliant in its simplicity. It reverses the 
moral order, transforming the “underprivileged” into a “privileged 
class,” transforming society’s victims into “victimizers.” Following 
the Southern Strategy, Reagan utilized racialized crime 
narratives to displace the image of the deserving poor with the 
image of the poor Black criminal.65 This narrative set the stage for 
a total transformation of government intervention, replacing the 
safety net with a metal cage. 
With pro-prison, pro-policing politics so firmly entrenched in 
the American psyche, in the late twentieth century politicians on 
both sides of the aisle competed for the mantle of tough-on-crime 
by proposing to expand police departments and prison capacity. 
During the 1988 presidential race, George H.W. Bush ran the 
infamous race-baiting Willie Horton ad,66  hammering Michael 
Dukakis for furloughing (temporarily releasing) the convicted 
felon, who then raped a White woman. The ad featured a mugshot 
of Horton—a “very scary looking, disheveled, wild-eyed black 
man,” one expert observed—with the message, “Weekend prison 
passes—Dukakis on crime.”67 In the wake of Dukakis’s electoral 
decimation, Democratic Senators Joe Biden and Chuck Schumer 
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feared the “Hortonizing” of the entire Democratic Party.68 They 
masterminded the “Biden-Schumer strategy,” as an insider called 
it,69 to court moderate voters by making Democrats the party of 
law enforcement in an era of racialized hysteria over crack. Biden 
had previously authored the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which 
established the infamous 100:1 crack-powder cocaine sentencing 
disparity.70 
Biden introduced the initial version of the now-infamous 
“1994 Crime Bill” in 1991 and boasted that Republicans would no 
longer be able to “demagogue crime.”71 “By 1992, polls showed that 
the public had gone from viewing Democrats as relatively weak on 
crime to [seeing] the parties as virtually even.”72 Bill Clinton made 
the Crime Bill a priority of his campaign and a signature 
achievement of his first term. Signing the law, Clinton reminded 
folks that it was necessary because “[g]angs and drugs have taken 
over our streets and undermined our schools.”73 Biden touted the 
new law’s ability to change the face of the Democratic party: “The 
liberal wing of the Democratic Party is now for 60 new death 
penalties. . . . The liberal wing of the Democratic Party is for 
100,000 cops. The liberal wing of the Democratic Party is for 
125,000 new State prison cells.”74 
Similar dynamics of carceral politics and ideology played out 
in states and localities. Public fears about leftist ideologies, 
integration, and urban Black spaces made crime control a political 
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ace to politicians of all stripes.75 The salience of crime grew in force 
throughout the ’80s and ’90s, aided by opportunistic politicians 
and the burgeoning twenty-four-hour-news industry. 76  Today, 
there is a wealth of historical and sociological literature describing 
the rise of the late twentieth-century penal state and the scholarly 
consensus that crime-control trends were driven by “pathological 
politics.”77  Still, many commentators mechanically repeat the 
conventional narrative that policing and prosecution expanded 
and became harsher in the 1980s and 1990s in reaction to a 
precipitous spike in crime. 78  Although there is some empirical 
support for increased crime during that time, such was not the 
main driver of the penological changes.79 
The crime fears that hastened Nixon’s victory did not relate 
to a rash of robberies and assaults but to fears over rioting hippies 
and undifferentiated minority “Negro-Puerto Rican[s].”80 And to 
the extent that people did fear “crime” in the ’80s and ’90s, 
conservative and liberal political rhetoric had already established 
the “crime problem” as an urban Black problem.81 Whether by 
“[l]iberal racial pity” or “conservative racial contempt,” as political 
scientist Naomi Murakawa put it, crime was synonymized with 
Black “pathology,” making it impossible to neatly sever crime fears 
from the older racial segregationist programs that drove initial 
policing investments.82 Images of “blighted” Black neighborhoods 
have regularly made media rounds for decades. To this day, 
Americans, when polled, consistently express that crime is 
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perpetually increasing, a “pressing problem,” and “out of 
control.”83 
Still, most people—including progressive scholars—simply 
accept the widely touted contention that tough-on-crime 
governance in the ’80s and ’90s was a clear response to out-of-
control crime plaguing the entire nation.84 However, the empirical 
evidence does not show that the crime-control agenda was a 
reactionary phenomenon based on clear law enforcement need. 
When Clinton signed the 1994 Crime Bill, crime rates were 
already in decline.85 Analyzing data on police employment and 
crime rates from 1991 to 2000, researchers William McCarty, Ling 
Ren, and Solomon Zhao concluded that “increases in police 
strength during the 1990s [had] little to do with changes in all 
measures of the crime rate after controlling for other demographic 
factors.”86 
In the 1980s, there was an uptick in select violent crimes in 
urban areas related to the crack cocaine trade.87 The media and 
politicians focused relentlessly on the “crack epidemic,” stirring up 
fears of “Black crime.”88  The images of crack-driven Black 
criminality played into the politics that drove policing’s expansion 
everywhere, despite the fact that crack-associated crime did not 
affect the vast majority of American communities.89 Examining 
crime data between 1979 and 1992, demographers Scott Boggess 
and John Bound conclude that “[t]he statistics do not support the 
notion that there [was] any overall rise in the level of criminal 
activity.”90 
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C. Policing Does Not Fight Crime 
Finally, the police-as-crime-fighter narrative fares poorly 
from an empirical efficacy standpoint. Today, there are decades 
worth of criminological research and hundreds of thousands of 
pages written on whether police activity actually reduces and 
prevents crime. Much of this scholarship comes from economists 
who generally view crime and enforcement in purely financial 
terms and concentrate on the question of whether a dollar spent 
on policing prevents a dollar worth of crime in some fixed point in 
time.91 Now, some scholars critique the purely economic approach 
as unduly narrow. It tends to omit the financial costs that arrest, 
police violence, and criminal prosecution impose on individuals 
and communities.92 Moreover, economic analysis does not look at 
social costs, happiness indexes, the differential meaning of a dollar 
to different people, and the like. Nor does it consider more inchoate 
costs, like the healthcare price of the morbid stress suffered by 
those who experience racialized police violence or the lost 
productivity of communities whose potential young workforce is 
trapped in a repeat cycle of arrest, incarceration, and collateral 
consequences. In short, the police efficiency calculus virtually 
ignores the long-term costs that systematic state violence imposes 
on Black Americans.93 
Nevertheless, even within such narrow parameters that look 
only at the dollar-based efficiency of police at reducing crime, 
“[t]here is a consensus [among experts] that the standard model of 
policing, which focuses on random preventive patrols and rapid 
response time, does not significantly reduce crime or even fear of 
crime,” as economists Justin McCrary and Deepak Premkumar 
note.94 Researchers have also determined that “proactive policing,” 
which includes strict enforcement of “quality-of-life” offenses, 
street sweeps, and stop-and-frisks, does not reduce, and in fact 
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may increase, crime. 95  Now, regarding hot-spot policing—a 
policing where resources are invested in targeted areas—McCrary 
and Premkumar conclude that the studies show the technique 
tends to reduce crime.96  Still, they acknowledge that such a 
reduction may be due to people avoiding the targeted areas or due 
to arrestees being temporarily incapacitated.97  And given that 
targeted policing entrenches segregation, it may have an overall 
criminogenic effect. Researchers, for example, find that “racial 
residential segregation is strongly associated with the Black-
White racial disparity in overall rates of firearm homicide at the 
state level.”98 
Regardless of the state of contemporary research on the 
return on investment of hot-spot policing, the important point is 
that after 150 years in which organized policing has been a daily 
fact of American life, we still cannot proclaim with any reasonable 
certainty that policing actually fights crime.99  Consider, for 
example, the 2014 study by criminologists Gary Kleck and J.C. 
Barnes, Do More Police Lead to More Crime Deterrence?100 The 
authors noted at the outset that the “[r]esearch concerning the 
deterrent effect of police activity on crime is decidedly mixed” and 
that “no prior research has directly tested whether police strength 
levels actually affect prospective offenders’ perceptions of arrest 
risks.”101  So, they set out to measure the deterrent effect of 
increased police presence by examining “individual-level 
perceptions of arrest likelihood.” 102  The researchers discovered 
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that “police manpower levels have no effect on perceptions of the 
risk of arrest, and thus do not influence the amount of general 
deterrent effects on crime.”103 And in typical empirical researcher 
style, their conclusion that policing is not efficient was all about 
fiscal efficiency: 
In light of these findings, policy makers may want to 
reconsider whether increases in police manpower bring 
sufficient crime reduction benefits to justify their costs. 
Conversely, in times of fiscal crisis, it is worth considering 
the possibility that cuts in police strength may be 
implemented without causing crime increases. Even in times 
of fiscal plenty, it may be worth thinking about alternative 
investments that are more likely to reduce crime.104 
Indeed, policing studies typically assess efficacy and efficiency by 
comparing a given policing program to a world without that 
program and without alternative crime reduction efforts. The 
studies, like the conventional narrative, presume that policing and 
not policing are the sole crime interdiction options. This 
presumption is despite the fact that organized policing was not 
borne of the need to reduce crime, and that its relationship to 
crime rates is tenuous at best. And even with this all-or-nothing 
focus, the studies still do not demonstrate with clarity that policing 
programs are efficacious or efficient. Policing scholar David Bailey 
put it bluntly: 
The police do not prevent crime. This is one of the best kept 
secrets of modern life. Experts know it, the police know it, 
but the public does not know it. Yet the police pretend that 
they are society’s best defense against crime and continually 
argue that if they are given more resources, especially 
personnel, they will be able to protect communities against 
crime. This is a myth.105 
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III.  THE PURPOSE OF POLICING 
Policing has never really been about crime. And yet, well-
meaning scholars and reformers have expended enormous 
amounts of intellectual and political capital on trying to “fix” the 
institution so that it can finally fulfill its community crime-
fighting function in a fair manner. This persistent emphasis on 
improving police techniques, which legitimizes and strengthens 
the policing institution, is largely a legacy of liberal politics and 
sensibilities. According to Naomi Murakawa, Democrats during 
the 1960s spearheaded the police “professionalization” agenda, 
which involved an opaque set of imperatives to make the police 
more objective: reliance on data, hierarchical structure, and 
resistance to outside political or social influence.106  Liberal 
politicians undertook this project precisely to dislodge “the ‘deep-
seated belief amongst our Negro citizens that equal law 
enforcement in police practices does not exist anywhere in  
our land,’” as one Democratic senator remarked. 107  The 
professionalization movement intended to, and was largely 
successful in, the entrenchment of the police-as-crime-fighter 
narrative, with the result that today most people see the bad 
effects of policing as failures—unintended and intermittent 
breakdowns to be worked on.108 
Despite the general scholarly fixation with fixing the police’s 
crime-fighting failures, several critical scholars have instead 
focused on understanding policing’s success in shaping social, 
political, and economic arrangements. Michel Foucault famously 
observes in Discipline and Punish, “For the observation that 
prison fails to eliminate crime, one should perhaps substitute the 
hypothesis that prison has succeeded extremely well . . . in 
producing the delinquent as a pathologized subject.”109 He goes on, 
“So successful has the prison been that, after a century and a half 
of ‘failures’, the prison still exists, producing the same results, and 
there is the greatest reluctance to dispense with it.”110 Similarly, 
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we might see the police as wildly successful at fulfilling their role 
of maintaining hierarchy and state control, from defending racial 
capitalism to maintaining class dominance and social order in 
times of class conflict and scarcity.111  Robinson and Scaglion 
contend, “The police institution is created by the emerging 
dominant class as an instrument for the preservation of its control 
over restricted access to basic resources, over the political 
apparatus governing this access, and over the labor force 
necessary to provide the surplus upon which the dominant class 
lives.”112 
In recent years, as Black Lives Matter activists and other 
criminal justice reformers spotlighted the perils of policing, an 
increasing number of scholarly commentators pushed back on the 
notion that racist police brutality is simply crime-fighting run 
amok.113 Author Alex Vitale wrote in 2017, “The reality is that the 
police exist primarily as a system for managing and even 
producing inequality by suppressing social movements and tightly 
managing the behaviors of poor and nonwhite people: those on the 
losing end of economic and political arrangements.”114  Law 
Professor Paul Butler recently responded to the contention that 
the law enforcement machine is simply in need of a tune-up with 
this blunt assessment: “Don’t get it twisted – the criminal justice 
system ain’t broke. It’s working just the way it’s supposed to.”115 
Those horrified by the recent spate of high-profile police brutality 
cases could gain invaluable insights by analyzing racist violence 
not from the point of view of failure but of success. 
A. Bluelining as Police Success 
From its very inception, the institution of American policing 
has succeeded extremely well at controlling race, space, and 
place.116 Police, in tandem with organized private neighborhood 
watches, have served as the border patrols of middle-class 
neighborhoods, reflecting and reinforcing the mythology of the 
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suburbs being “invaded” by minorities.117  Critical race theorist 
Keith Aoki explains the role of geography in maintaining 
hierarchy, “Space defines political boundaries as well as private 
property—constructing, ratifying and reproducing community and 
individual identities as well as pre-existing distributive 
inequities—and then, importantly, making those outcomes seem 
‘natural.’ Wall Street thrives and South Central Los Angeles 
seethes—that’s just the way things are.”118 
Indeed, President Trump emphasized the need to protect the 
suburbs from minorities, tweeting in August 2020, “The ‘suburban 
housewife’ will be voting for me[] [because] [t]hey want safety 
[and] are thrilled that I ended the long running program where 
low income housing would invade their neighborhood.”119  His 
entreaties late in the presidential campaign for “suburban women” 
to “please like me” because he “saved your damn neighborhood” 
were relentless and depressingly comical.120  Trump’s rhetoric 
follows what philosopher Olúfémi Táíwò calls the “basic social-
structural characteristics of those who spread the capitalist 
economic system: a tendency to organise populations into clusters, 
to separate those clusters into vertical hierarchies, and to 
legitimate this stratification via racialist thought and practice.”121 
Dean Onwuachi-Willig has focused on George Zimmerman’s 
murder acquittal as an exemplar of state and social toleration for 
the violent maintenance of spatial and social segregation.122 The 
killing of innocent teen Trayvon Martin was the culmination of 
Zimmerman’s years-long quest to stave off spatial diversification 
by privately patrolling his neighborhood and regularly calling the 
police to prevent its penetration by Black “outsiders.”123 In Policing 
the Boundaries of Whiteness, Onwuachi-Willig illustrates through 
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a deep historical examination of Zimmerman’s Sanford, Florida, 
neighborhood that geography and racial hierarchy are inextricably 
linked.124 She writes: 
[R]esidents were working to preserve the whiteness of the 
Retreat at Twin Lakes or at least what they perceived as a 
“white space.” . . . For some of the residents of the Retreat at 
Twin Lakes like Zimmerman and Taaffe, they viewed the 
neighborhood as a white space—meaning a space that is 
economically more privileged and socially desirable because 
it is occupied primarily by Whites—and they saw any Blacks 
whom they did not know as intruders. As a consequence, the 
narrative they developed for the downturn in their 
neighborhood centered around race and the sense that their 
“white” neighborhood was being besieged by black males, 
despite the fact that only 2 out of 44 incidents were confirmed 
to involve Blacks or, more specifically, black males—for a 
total of three Blacks. More so, the Retreat’s neighborhood 
watch residents, particularly Zimmerman, acted on this 
racialized view of the neighborhood by repeatedly making 
calls to 911 whenever they encountered persons they did not 
know who were black, but not doing the same with Whites 
who were unknown to them.125 
This neighborhood border patrolling was aided and abetted by the 
Sanford police, who likewise adopted a false race-based view of 
crime in the neighborhood.126 Onwuachi-Willig explains: 
Indeed, the racial meaning of the Retreat at Twin Lakes was 
also seemingly adopted by the police officers who arrived on 
the scene to investigate the killing of Martin. Viewing Martin 
much like Zimmerman did before and after he followed the 
boy—as an outsider, not a guest or resident in the 
neighborhood—the officers did not knock on any doors in the 
neighborhood to see if Martin might be living in or visiting 
someone in the gated community. In fact, they left Martin at 
the morgue as a “John Doe” overnight until his parents called 
the police in a frantic search for their son.127 
Police are essential to maintaining White, nonpoor citizens’ 
dominion not just over middle-class neighborhoods but also over 
shared spaces. Officers relentlessly patrol commercial areas and 
communal spaces like parks and plazas to ensure that the “wrong” 
people stay in their highly demarcated and tightly controlled 
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areas. The police’s geographical domination on behalf of the 
privileged comes under the guise of preventing the “disorder” that 
is offensive to the “community.”128  The word “community” is 
prevalent in public order discourses, implying that the police are 
merely passively following some neutral and natural consensus 
about who does and does not belong in shared spaces over which, 
in theory, no one person or group has a veto. The result, as critical 
geographer Marie-Eve Sylvestre observes, is that “public spaces 
have been reorganized and reordered in the context of disorder 
policing so as to create new barriers and signs of exclusion that 
reduce the range of possible sensations, social practices, and 
interactions.”129 
Police draw blue lines around Black neighborhoods—just as 
banks drew their red lines—designating them as high-risk areas 
and stigmatizing them as degraded, pathological spaces.130 Police 
refer to these hyper-surveilled, tightly controlled, excluded 
neighborhoods as “high crime areas.” To be sure, the image of the 
high-crime Black “ghetto” has been particularly salient in 
American political culture and has played a significant role in 
Americans’ support for the massive police control of minority 
communities and inalterable belief that crime is always on the 
rise.131  The “high crime neighborhood” language once again 
deceptively suggests that the police’s program of spatial 
confinement and control over minority neighborhoods is really 
about crime interdiction. 
However, decades-worth of studies have shown that “high 
crime neighborhood” is merely a proxy for poor minority 
neighborhood. The designation has more to do with the racial 
make-up of the area than the number of crimes committed there. 
A 2019 study by researchers Ben Grunwald and Jeffrey Fagan, the 
latest in a long-line of research, concludes, “[Officers’] assessments 
of high-crime areas are only weakly correlated with actual crime 
rates. The suspect’s race predicts whether an officer deems an area 
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high crime . . . .”132  Moreover, researchers find that “one of the 
strongest predictors of police strength” is “the percentage of Black 
population” in an area.133  A study of police deployment in the 
1990s confirmed that “[an] increase in 1% of Black population 
[was] associated with an increase in 5.54 police officers per 
100,000 residents.”134 
Police have set forth other rationales for bluelining Black 
neighborhoods. The infamous “broken-window theory” postulates 
that cleaning up the streets of the appearance of lawlessness by 
arresting those who commit minor offenses, such as graffiti artists, 
loiterers, and sex workers, efficiently reduces major crimes.135 In 
1982, criminologist George Kelling and social scientist James Q. 
Wilson wrote an influential popular press article in the Atlantic 
magazine, Broken Windows.136  In it, they argue that arresting 
“disreputable or obstreperous or unpredictable people” like 
“panhandlers, drunks, addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, 
loiterers, [and] the mentally disturbed” creates a virtuous law-
abiding community mentality and deters would-be felons from 
committing serious crimes.137 “Broken-window theory” champions 
the very vagrancy policing that proved so critical to maintaining 
de facto enslavement in the Reconstruction-era South and to 
managing the economic casualties of the industrializing North.138 
The theory purports to be about the interdiction of serious 
crimes, although the social science has shown that quality-of-
policing does not reduce serious crime and may exacerbate the 
structural conditions underlying criminal activity.139  However, 
from the beginning, broken-windows policing advocates have not 
characterized sweeping up people whose only offense is being 
young, poor, or unhoused as an unfortunate cost of preventing 
“real” crime.140  Instead, they have emphasized that managing 
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these “obstreperous” people is a crucial end in itself.141 Big-city 
police chiefs like William Bratton, New York City Mayor Rudy 
Giuliani’s first police commissioner, strongly embraced and 
quickly enacted broken-windows policing.142 He explains that he 
supported the policing method because of his personal experience 
as an officer in Boston, where “prostitution and graffiti” were big 
problems in inner cities.143 For him, street sweeping is itself an 
exercise in fighting “crimes committed against the community.”144 
At the same time, broken-window theory’s emphasis on visible 
disorder has given the police a scientifically sanitized justification 
for their long-standing program of demarcating poor, urban 
neighborhoods for uniquely aggressive street policing. 
The bluelining of Black neighborhoods establishes within 
cities archipelagos of diminished citizenship, where police use 
aggressive stop-and-frisks, intense surveillance, and military-
style home raids to keep the people in their spatial and social 
place. “You cannot truly be free when the police are able to set 
upon you at will, for no particular reason at all,” scholar Keeanga-
Yamahtta Taylor laments, “[i]t is a constant reminder of the space 
between freedom and ‘unfreedom,’ where the contested citizenship 
of African Americans is held.”145 While claiming to be the “thin 
blue line” between social order and crime run amok, police were 
always the thick blue line between elites and the marginalized. 
Recently, New York Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-
Cortez, a staunch critic of police violence, considered the question 
of what “an America with defunded police look[s] like.” She 
answered simply, “It looks like a suburb.”146  To be sure, one 
residing in a “low crime” suburb is unlikely to recall witnessing a 
heavily armed militarized “jump-out squad,” clad in flak jackets 
and ski masks, alight a serial-killer-style white van and slam a 
bunch of youths against a wall. But many in targeted 
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neighborhoods would nod with a sad familiarity.147 Angela Harris 
observes: 
[P]olice brutality is not random. It follows the vectors of 
power established in the larger society in which white 
dominates nonwhite and rich dominates poor. Police often, 
and not without justification, understand their charge as the 
protection of “nice” neighborhoods and “decent” people 
against those perceived to be a threat. In practice, this often 
means that male power and state power converge on the 
black and Latino “underclass.”148 
Courts have consistently upheld the differential treatment of 
those in “high crime neighborhoods,” thereby inscribing into the 
law racial segregation and inequality. Many are familiar with the 
seminal case Terry v. Ohio. That case, decided amid the political 
and demographic upheavals of 1968, authorizes police to stop, 
question, and search individuals without probable cause.149 The 
Supreme Court declared that to stop and investigate an 
individual, police need only reasonable articulable suspicion that 
crime may be “afoot.”150 If they have that level of information, 
detention and frisk does not offend the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure. 151  The Court’s 
creation of such a nebulous and low bar prompted Justice Douglas 
to lament, “There have been powerful hydraulic pressures 
throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water 
down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper 
hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater 
than it is today.”152 
Although Terry technically allows the police to engage in “stop 
and frisks” anywhere, courts have made clear that police have far 
more leeway to detain people in bluelined neighborhoods. In the 
2000 case Illinois v. Wardlow, the Court held that a person’s mere 
presence in a “high-crime area” constitutes half of the reasonable 
articulable suspicion that justified a stop.153 The other half of the 
 
 147. See Jason Cherkis, Rough Justice, WASH. CITY PAPER (Jan. 7, 2000), https://washi 
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 148. Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
777, 797 (2000); see also Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black 
People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 149–
50, 163–64 (2017). 
 149. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968). 
 150. Id. at 30. 
 151. Id. at 30–31. 
 152. Id. at 39 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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equation is flight from police.154  The Court was unmoved by 
Justice Stevens’s dissenting point that “[a]mong some citizens, 
particularly minorities and those residing in high crime 
areas . . . the fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or 
without justification, believes that contact with the police can 
itself be dangerous.”155 In Justice Stevens’s view, the very fact of a 
high-crime neighborhood negates the inference that flight 
indicates criminality.156  Alas, the Court presumed, without 
evidence, both that police’s designation of a neighborhood as “high 
crime” means that each one of its inhabitants is relatively 
suspicious and that flight invariably confirms such suspicion. 
Through doctrinal machinations and formalistic rhetorical 
flourishes, the Court operatively defined arbitrary police 
interference into the lives of people in bluelined minority 
neighborhoods as constitutionally permissible crime interdiction. 
In 2012, the Center for Constitutional Rights obtained class 
certification in its suit, Floyd v. City of New York, which 
challenged the constitutionality of the NYPD’s longstanding stop-
and-frisk program. The program peaked in 2011 with nearly 
700,000 stops.157 While Terry rendered the bulk of stop and frisks 
legal because of its low bar for suspicion, the Floyd plaintiffs 
argued that the Department and City had tolerated widespread 
violations of even Terry’s minimal standard and had 
disproportionately targeted minorities in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.158  The 
plaintiffs presented statistics that of the 4.4 million stops between 
2004 and 2012, over 80% were of Black and Latinx people while 
10% were of Whites (all were mostly of men).159 For reference, New 
York’s population in 2010 was 52% Black and Latinx and 33% 
White. 160  Hundreds of the stops clearly lacked reasonable 
articulable suspicion, and thousands of them were based on vague 
and meaningless, but ostensibly constitutional, criteria like the 
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person made a “furtive movement[]” or had a “[s]uspicious 
[b]ulge.”161 
Unsurprisingly, the police department insisted that these 
dignity-harming and often violent encounters were necessary tools 
of crime interdiction.162 Unsurprisingly, the data revealed that the 
program was in fact wildly ineffective at interdicting crime. Fewer 
than three percent of the stops resulted in the discovery of 
weapons or contraband.163 The hit-rate numbers were even smaller 
for minorities stopped by police.164 The police and city also justified 
the stark racial disparities as a part of the crime-fighting mission. 
According to them, the disparate racial impact of the stop-and-
frisk program was merely a result of the department’s embrace of 
data-driven policing methodologies.165 Police chiefs, they argued, 
deployed officers to “high crime” areas with statistically higher 
arrest rates. 166  They just also happened to be ones with high 
concentrations of Black and Latinx people.167 
The city’s argument does not, of course, explain why the police 
also disproportionately targeted minorities in non-“high crime” 
neighborhoods. Nor can it overcome the racist-arrest-information-
in/racist-arrest-information-out problem or prove that the 
overwhelmingly innocent Black people in a targeted neighborhood 
were each statistically more crime-prone than the average 
person. 168  “Why would the people stopped by the NYPD, both 
criminal and law-abiding, so closely resemble the criminal 
population—or, more precisely, the NYPD’s understanding of the 
criminal population, based on its limited suspect data?” District 
Court Judge Scheindlin queried. “A simple explanation exists,” she 
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disproportionately deploy to and use disparately aggressive tactics in Black 
neighborhoods). 
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ventured, “the racial composition of the people stopped by the 
NYPD resembles what the NYPD perceives to be the racial 
composition of the criminal population because that is why they 
were stopped.”169 
Indeed, during the course of litigation, a smoking gun piece of 
evidence revealed that racialized social control, not individual 
crime interdiction, was the point of the program. State Senator 
Eric Adams testified that during a 2010 discussion of the stop-and-
frisk program with New York City Police Commissioner Raymond 
Kelly, Adams expressed concerns about the program’s racial 
disparities.170 “Kelly responded that he focused on young Blacks 
and Hispanics ‘because he wanted to instill fear in them, every 
time they leave their home, they could be stopped by the police.’”171 
The senator was “amazed” that Kelly was “comfortable enough to 
say that.”172 
Judge Scheindlin issued a landmark ruling that the NYPD, 
through the stop-and-frisk program, for years had been violating 
New Yorkers’ rights to be free from unlawful search and seizure 
and unlawful racial discrimination. 173  Then-Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg and the NYPD were furious, and they fought tooth and 
nail against the judgment. 174  Bloomberg had always been 
forthright about how he saw the NYPD. “I have my own army in 
the NYPD,” he told a crowd in 2011, “which is the seventh biggest 
army in the world.”175 In a dramatic turn of events, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals issued a sua sponte order staying the 
decision, remanding the case, and disqualifying Judge 
Scheindlin.176 According to the court, the proceedings were tainted 
by Judge Sheindlin’s bias against the police.177 
What was the evidence of this bias? First, Judge Sheindlin 
had requested the case and had indicated in her prior rulings her 
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belief that the stop-and-frisk program was ripe for a class-action 
challenge.178 But this was hardly out of the ordinary. The Southern 
District of New York had a long-standing “related case” rule where 
judges were assigned cases similar to ones they had in the past.179 
Second, Judge Scheindlin’s detractors argued, and the Second 
Circuit agreed, that her statements to the press were 
inappropriate.180  She did speak to the press, in the face of 
reporters’ requests for her to respond to Kelly and Bloomberg’s 
relentless public attacks on her objectivity.181  Here is her 
“offending” statement in the New Yorker: “Too many judges, 
especially because so many of our judges come out of [the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office for the Southern District], become government 
judges . . . . I’m independent. I believe in the Constitution. I 
believe in the Bill of Rights. These issues come up, and I take them 
quite seriously. I’m not afraid to rule against the government.”182 
Millions of stop and frisks and unnecessary arrests happen on 
the streets of bluelined neighborhoods, and they nearly all proceed 
with the full blessings of law.183  The Floyd litigation was 
exceptional, involving years of empirical research, newspaper 
exposés on NYPD culture, and scores of impact litigators. And still, 
the legal system ultimately did not have the capacity to recognize 
the NYPD’s clearly discriminatory program as anything other 
than ordinary crime interdiction. For plaintiffs to prevail on a 
discrimination claim against an officer, they have to show that the 
individual officer was an intentional racist who targeted the 
plaintiff because of race. 184  Otherwise, the street policing that 
disproportionately burdens, wounds, and even kills tens of 
thousands of Black men every year is, in the eyes of the law, just 
neutral crime fighting. It is business as usual. 
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B. Brutality Is Business as Usual 
Brutality is a critical part of the business of policing. It is 
sanctioned and sanitized by law as a necessary component of the 
police fulfilling their crime-control function. Interfacing with 
people in “high crime areas” is dangerous business, the logic goes, 
and the police must have the means to protect themselves. Police 
must be armed with deadly weapons and have the “reasonable” 
ability to use them and violent tactics like chokeholds to prevent 
risks to themselves as they bring people to heel. Given this, 
discriminatory police brutality is not a function of implicitly or 
explicitly racist cops. It is simply the police, well, policing within 
bluelined neighborhoods.185 Researcher Michael Seigel analyzed 
the data on police killings and found that the police’s 
disproportionate use of deadly force on Black people is not 
“primarily a function of individual-level factors, such as implicit 
bias against Black individuals or the racial composition of the 
police force.”186 Instead, it is “primarily a function of: (1) the degree 
of historical structural racism in that location and (2) the degree 
to which Black people living in that location are segregated into 
neighborhoods with concentrated disadvantage.”187 
The law encourages brutality in these policed spaces by 
conferring on officers near absolute power to physically dominate 
the individuals—Black or White—they encounter on the street. 
The law makes clear that officers have no obligation to 
countenance resistance. So ingrained in the law is this principle of 
police domination that many courts, when examining whether an 
officer killed in self-defense, refuse to consider whether the officer 
unfairly detained the individual in the first place, wrongfully 
escalated the situation, or provoked the force. Instead, courts 
consider only whether the officer acted reasonably (had reasonable 
fear) in the “split-second” moment when he pulled the trigger.188 
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Such was the argument advanced by Cuyahoga County 
prosecutor Timothy McGinty to convince a grand jury not to indict 
Timothy Loehmann, the officer who killed Tamir Rice.189  The 
killing occurred after Loehmann’s partner drove off the road, onto 
the grass, and right up to the park pavilion where the baby-faced, 
twelve-year-old Black tween was playing with a toy gun. Within 
seconds of the squad car pulling up, and without any conversation, 
investigation, or pause, Loehmann shot out the passenger side, 
extinguishing Tamir’s life.190 District Attorney McGinty, breaking 
the case up into split-second intervals, successfully argued that 
the sole moment that mattered out of the entire series of 
outrageous police actions leading to the child’s death was when the 
officer fired the fatal shot.191 At that moment, McGinty asserted, 
Loehmann could have believed that Tamir was about to point a 
real gun at him.192 Thus, regardless of the overall absurdity of the 
police’s actions, in that one moment, the officer may have felt 
threatened, so the killing was “reasonable.”193 
This longstanding legal sanitization of brutality can be traced, 
in part, to events that occurred on a November day in 1984 when 
Dethorne Graham, a diabetic, experienced a sudden insulin 
reaction. Graham rushed into a convenience store to get an orange 
juice. Finding the line too long, he rushed back out of the store and 
into his friend William Berry’s car to go to a nearby friend’s 
house.194 Charlotte, North Carolina police officer M.S. Connor was 
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watching and regarded Graham’s quick departure from the store 
as “suspicious.” He followed Berry’s car and then initiated a Terry 
stop.195 After being pulled over, Berry explained to Connor that 
Graham was having a diabetic reaction and asked the officer to get 
the sick man some sugar.196 
Connor was unmoved by Berry’s exhortations. He ordered the 
two to wait while he contacted the store to investigate and called 
for backup.197 Graham ran out of the car and passed out on the 
sidewalk. When backup arrived, Berry pleaded to Connor and the 
other officers to help Graham and give him sugar. They ignored 
Berry, instead taking Graham’s hands and cuffing them tightly, 
as the sick man lay prone on the ground.198 One officer remarked, 
“I’ve seen a lot of people with sugar diabetes that never acted like 
this. Ain’t nothing wrong with the motherfucker but drunk. Lock 
the son of a bitch up.”199 Graham mustered the energy to tell the 
officers to check for the diabetic seal in his wallet. The police 
responded by yelling “shut up,” shoving Graham’s face against the 
car hood, and throwing him head-first into the squad car.200 
Graham sustained severe injuries and sued the police 
department. The case went to a jury trial, where the judge directed 
a verdict for the police, ruling that no reasonable juror could find 
that the police used unconstitutional excessive force.201 According 
to the judge, a finding of excessive force required the jury to 
conclude that the police acted “maliciously and sadistically,” 
which, in the judge’s mind, no rational jury could.202 Eventually, 
the Supreme Court reversed that ruling on the ground that an 
officer’s subjective maliciousness is not the test for excessive 
force.203 However, the Court’s objective reasonableness standard is 
hardly more protective and left plenty of room for continued police 
brutality. 204  The Court opined, “The ‘reasonableness’ of a 
particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a 
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reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision 
of hindsight.”205 It went on to say that the officer must be allowed 
“to make split-second judgments . . . about the amount of force 
that is necessary in a particular situation” and “[a]n officer’s evil 
intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an 
objectively reasonable use of force.”206 The Court remanded the 
case, and it went back to trial. The jury found for the police, 
concluding that the gratuitously violent and degrading actions of 
Connor and his compatriots were, in the end, objectively 
reasonable.207 
In Graham v. Connor, as in Terry, racialized suspicion was 
perfectly compatible with constitutional reasonableness. The 
Graham Court did not bother to question Connor’s belief that 
Graham’s hasty departure from a store was suspicious enough to 
merit following Berry’s car and engaging in a prolonged 
investigative stop. One may not be surprised that Dethorne 
Graham was Black, a detail distinctly omitted from the Supreme 
Court’s recitation of the facts.208 In the end, the Court mandated 
strong deference to all police “judgments.” This apparently 
includes the judgment that Black men leaving stores quickly must 
be thieves and the judgment that vulnerable, dying men pleading 
for their lives are really just lying “motherfuckers.” What is the 
point of crying, “I can’t breathe” eleven times, as Eric Garner 
did,209 or twenty times, as George Floyd did,210 if the law says that 
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reasonable officers can ignore the cries as the ramblings of 
deceptive, intoxicated, or crazy “sons of bitches”? 
In recent months, we have witnessed appalling cases where 
individuals’ heart-wrenching pleas fell on cops’ deaf ears. George 
Floyd cried out to his mother, and Elijah McClain begged: 
I can’t breathe. I have my ID right here. My name is Elijah 
McClain. That’s my house. I was just going home. I’m an 
introvert. I’m just different. That’s all. I’m so sorry. I have no 
gun. I don’t do that stuff. I don’t do any fighting. Why are you 
attacking me? I don’t even kill flies! I don’t eat meat! But I 
don’t judge people, I don’t judge people who do eat meat. 
Forgive me. All I was trying to do was become better. I will 
do it. I will do anything. Sacrifice my identity, I’ll do it. You 
all are phenomenal. You are beautiful and I love you. Try to 
forgive me. I’m a mood Gemini. I’m sorry. I’m so sorry. Ow, 
that really hurt. You are all very strong. Teamwork makes 
the dream work. Oh, I’m sorry I wasn’t trying to do that. I 
just can’t breathe correctly.211 
Aurora, Colorado, police stopped and ultimately killed 
McClain, a gentle, cat-loving, violin-playing, twenty-three-year-
old Black man, simply because a passing driver thought McClain’s 
manner of dress and walking was suspicious.212 Through the din 
of the police pinning, reprimanding, and threatening to set dogs 
on him, a terrified, vomiting McClain tried to explain: “I was just 
going home. . . . I’m just different. . . . I have no gun. I don’t do that 
stuff. . . . I don’t even kill flies! I don’t even eat meat!”213 Elijah 
McClain experienced this Terry stop and his last breath on August 
24, 2019.214 
Three days later, an officer from that same Aurora, Colorado, 
department, Levi Huffine, arrested Shataeah Kelly for a 
municipal violation (a minor misdemeanor) stemming from a 
fight.215 Kelly yelled and cussed at the officer while he took her 
into custody, so Huffine decided to hog tie the twenty-eight-year-
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old woman, tethering her feet and hands together behind her back. 
Kelly ended up face down the floor with her feet toward the roof in 
the backseat of the cruiser.216 The weight of her body pressed on 
her head and neck. “Officer please, I can’t breathe,” Kelly cried. “I 
don’t want to die like this. I’m about to break my neck.”217 Huffine 
ignored her cries and left her in that deadly position for twenty-
one minutes. Experts say Kelly is lucky to be alive.218 As the ride 
proceeded, Kelly became increasingly panicked, pleading, “My 
neck is killing me dude. Help me, I can’t breathe.” Finally, in 
desperation, the Black woman implored of the White police officer, 
“I beg you master.”219 
Incidents like these are frequently characterized as 
outrageous violations of the law, but the law of Graham and its 
progeny tell another story. These incidents are violations of moral 
conscience, but they are aided and abetted by law. Officers 
detaining Black people for innocuous behavior is reasonable 
seizure. Officers violently restraining detainees is reasonable 
force. Officers disbelieving and ignoring detainees’ cries to dial 
back the restraint is reasonable judgment in the field. As Butler 
counsels, “The problem is not illegal police misconduct; the 
problem is legal police conduct.”220 
We also might be tempted to believe that, regardless of 
whether these brutality incidents are legal, they are not standard 
practice but the rogue actions of particularly “malicious and 
sadistic” individuals.221 Such a presumption underlies claims that 
police violence will be remedied when departments adopt early 
warning systems and share bad-cop registries. The abusive 
language used in Graham might seem to confirm the idea that 
police violence is gratuitous and gleeful. Moreover, police brutality 
may seem deviant because killings—statistic outliers—receive all 
the publicity.222  
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But look more carefully at the chokehold videos. They are 
horrific and tragic, sad and revolting, but not because the officers 
are in a frenzied orgy of gratuitous violence. These cases are so 
horrifying because the victims are crying out, vomiting, begging, 
and dying. But the officers themselves are just steadily and 
resolutely using their department-approved carotid holds and 
restraint techniques and casually directing onlookers away. This 
brutality is banal. It is routine. It is standard practice when people 
do not softly submit. It is “split-second judgment[] . . . about the 
amount of force that is necessary.”223 Accordingly, Professor Devon 
Carbado argues that we should not “think of police killings of 
African Americans as aberrant and extraordinary, failing to see 
their connections to the routine, to the everyday, and to the 
ordinary.”224 
From the roving police gangs of old, the police have always 
trafficked in brutality. And while professionalization reduced 
some of the more gratuitous, messy, and disorganized violence, it 
also formalized violence as a best practice. Police training, now 
highly official and bureaucratized, ingrains in cadets the notion 
that people in bluelined neighborhoods—the ones officers are 
directed to constantly interface with—are invariably lethal and 
wily killers in disguise. They are walking bundles of deadly risk. 
The training says that it is kill-or-be-killed out there, which 
explains why many “police involved” shootings are perpetrated by 
anxiety-ridden rookies terrified that victims’ innocuous behavior 
is really a deadly threat. Former officer and policing expert Seth 
Stoughton writes that training instills a “warrior worldview, [in 
which] officers are locked in intermittent and unpredictable 
combat with unknown but highly lethal enemies.”225 The Aurora 
officers who accosted Elijah McClain described the 140-pound, 
wouldn’t-hurt-a-fly, vegetarian as preternaturally strong and 
perhaps hopped up on drugs—a description that encouraged 
paramedics to administer a deadly dose of ketamine, enough for a 
190-pound person.226 
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To be sure, many endorse the popular idea that police are in 
the riskiest business, and this idea is constantly reaffirmed to 
officers in their training. Stoughton observes: 
From their earliest days in the academy, would-be officers 
are told that their prime objective, the proverbial “first rule 
of law enforcement,” is to go home at the end of every shift. 
But they are taught that they live in an intensely hostile 
world. A world that is, quite literally, gunning for them. As 
early as the first day of the police academy, the dangers 
officers face are depicted in graphic and heart-wrenching 
recordings that capture a fallen officer’s last moments.227 
In reality, an officer’s risk of being killed by a suspect is not high. 
In 2019, “[forty-eight] officers died [in the line of duty] as a result 
of felonious acts.” Compare that to the 999 people police shot and 
killed.228 Police are approximately twenty-one times more likely to 
kill a person than be killed. 229  As of September, “on-the-job 
coronavirus infections” killed more police officers in 2020 than 
shootings, “car accidents, and all other causes combined.”230 The 
risk of on-the-job fatality for police officers is lower than that for 
fishers, loggers, pilots, roofers, garbage collectors, steel workers, 
drivers, farmers, and landscapers.231 
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Complementing—or perhaps offsetting—training messages 
that induce stress and fear, such as “you could die today, 
tomorrow, or next Friday,”232 are messages about the virtues and 
pleasures of being a professional violence dealer. On October 30, 
2020, Satchel Walton and Cooper Walton, two high school students 
at duPont Manuel High School in Louisville, Kentucky, published 
an article in the school paper that would soon make the 
Washington Post, send shockwaves through the internet, and elicit 
reactions from the highest levels of the Kentucky government.233 
The students published a copy of a PowerPoint presentation, “The 
Warrior Mindset,” which was used in the aughts for cadet training 
at the Kentucky State Police Academy. A civil rights lawyer had 
obtained the material from an open records request during 
litigation.234 He passed it along to the students, who published the 
PowerPoint in full along with their article. The part of the training 
materials that was most shocking was the quote, “[T]he very first 
essential for success is a perpetually constant and regular 
employment of violence.”235  Of course, any such lionization of 
violence is concerning, but what really shocked people of all stripes 
was the fact that the person who wrote those words was Adolf 
Hitler. They came straight out of Mein Kampf.236 
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Figure 1. 
The PowerPoint—and I recommend that you peruse it in 
full—fetishizes hypermasculinity and militarism at its best. Set on 
a background of Americana symbolism, all eagles and waving 
flags, it features a plethora of military battle imagery and 
depictions of men exercising paternalistic protection, disciplined 
strength, and religious calling. The number one thing a “[w]arrior 
[m]ust [p]rotect,” it declares, is “[r]eligious [f]aith.” 237  The 
document is peppered with sentimental pictures of civilian women 
and children juxtaposed with highly costumed, heavily armed, 
White, male soldiers in battle stances.238 “Truth and manliness 
will carry you through the world much better than policy, or tact, 
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or expediency,” the PowerPoint counsels, quoting Robert E. Lee.239 
The presentation emphasizes that the police officer-warrior stands 
above all others in society and his use of violence is more than 
community protection—it is God’s work. One slide declares, “If we 
had no engineers or no doctors for a generation, it would be 
difficult. But if we had no warriors, in a single generation we 
would be both damned and doomed.”240 
The messages of the PowerPoint often read as wildly 
inconsistent, encouraging both constant brutal violence and 
disciplined strength, even turning the other cheek. But in the end, 
the training reflects the dynamic I mentioned above, namely that 
brutality is the everyday business of policing. Within this policing 
culture and mindset, the officer is a “ruthless killer,” not for 
pleasure or because he is out of control, but as a matter of 
professional course. “The cultural image of a police officer,” Harris 
opines, “is a uniquely valuable and rare kind of man: tough and 
violent, yet heroic, protective, and necessary to society’s very 
survival.”241 
It is thus quite fitting that the presentation quotes Hitler’s 
views of violence. Philosopher Hannah Arendt famously discussed 
the “banality of evil,” exemplified by the Nazi genocidaire, who sits 
in his neat office with his loving family and classical music and 
orders the extermination of millions of innocent adults and 
children.242 The Nazi is the ultimate “loving father, spouse, and 
friend, as well as ruthless killer,” in the words of the PowerPoint.243 
Jungian psychologist Marie-Louise von Franz observed, “Goering 
[a high-ranking Nazi] without a qualm . . . could sign the death 
sentence for three hundred people, but if one of his birds died, then 
that fat old man would cry. . . . Cold brutality is very often covered 
up by sentimentality.”244 
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Of course, one might respond that a presentation that openly 
quotes Hitler, not once but twice, is an outlier. (The PowerPoint 
also invokes Hitler’s quote, “It is always more difficult to fight 
against faith than against knowledge,” to drive home the point 
that police officers must internalize the warrior value system as 
faith so as to “eliminate[] HESITATION!”).245 And, to be sure, it is 
probably unusual for a training PowerPoint to end with a slide 
that simply states, “Über Alles.” The phrase comes from 
“Deutchschland Über Alles,” the first verse of the old German 
national anthem, which Hitler used to assert Germany’s 
superiority over other countries and Germans’ superiority over 
other races.246 Immediately after World War II, “Über Alles” was 
banned as part of Germany’s de-Nazification program, and the 
country permanently removed it from the national anthem.247 To 
be sure, such an open and honest embrace of Nazi-style militaristic 
authoritarianism is not evident in most police training material, 
and indeed police training is local and heterodox. Nevertheless, 
police departments typically emphasize the necessity and duty of 
using violence to control citizen-enemies and the dangers they 
pose, even if such sentiments are not dressed up in fascist finery. 
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Figure 2. 
By concentrating on training, I do not mean to deny that there 
are certain officers who, as individuals, have an outlying 
attraction to violence. Because policing is a well-known profession 
of violence and control, it attracts men—and it is overwhelmingly 
men—who find particular allure in physical domination.248 Within 
police ranks, we see many former military personnel and, 
according to recent media reports, a disturbing number of militant 
White supremacists. 249  Indeed, the toxic masculinity of police 
officers is a subject of frequent scholarly rumination.250 My point, 
 
 248. See Leigh Goodmark, Hands Up at Home: Militarized Masculinity and Police 
Officers Who Commit Intimate Partner Abuse, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1183, 1210–11 (2015); 
Radley Balko, Rise of the Warrior Cop, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2013, 4:44 PM), https://www.wsj 
.com/articles/SB10001424127887323848804578608040780519904 [https://perma.cc/VW2V 
-VYQ3]. 
 249. Simone Weichselbaum, Police with Military Experience More Likely to Shoot, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 15, 2018, 3:22 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/10/ 
15/police-with-military-experience-more-likely-to-shoot [https://perma.cc/4E93-GTBR]; 
Vets to Cops, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: COPS OFF., https://cops.usdoj.gov/vetstocops [https://per 
ma.cc/ZN7E-CEYS]; Glenn French, 4 Reasons Why Military Veterans Make Great Cops, 
POLICE1 (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.police1.com/police-jobs-and-careers/articles/4-reasons 
-why-military-veterans-make-great-cops-CXnbR6T9Kub4OwdK/ [https://perma.cc/HR8Y-
VV7N]; Sam Levin, White Supremacists and Militias Have Infiltrated Police Across US, 
Report Says, GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2020, 10:13 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2 
020/aug/27/white-supremacists-militias-infiltrate-us-police-report [https://perma.cc/2ZP4-
VQB8]; Grace Tatter & Meghna Chakrabarti, What’s the Connection Between Civilian 
Militias and the Police?, WBUR: ON POINT (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/20 
20/09/01/right-wing-militias-and-police [https://perma.cc/PC2G-EZ6U]. 
 250. See Harris, supra note 148, at 793; Jennifer Brown, From Cult of Masculinity to 
Smart Macho: Gender Perspectives on Police Occupational Culture, in 8 SOCIO. OF CRIME, 
L. & DEVIANCE 189, 200 (2007); Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s The Man?”: Masculinities 
 
58 HOUS. L. REV. 867 (2021) 
2021] THE POLICE AND “BLUELINING” 915 
however, is that the long-existing police brutality now under 
public scrutiny has never been just a problem of rogue White 
supremacists. There is a violence feedback loop that has been 
revolving for decades: policing is violent; that violence attracts 
those enamored with violence; many of these individuals become 
police officials; police officials codify violence as policy and ingrain 
it as practice; police officers train on violence policy and practice; 
officers are violent on the street, reinforcing that policing is 
violent; rinse and repeat. 
Perhaps no other facet of policing so clearly exemplifies how 
policing structures and institutions reflect and reinforce the fear-
based, masculinist, and raced glorification of police violence than 
SWAT. Journalist Radley Balko, in his seminal book on police 
militarization, Rise of the Warrior Cop, traces the development of 
SWAT in the late twentieth century. SWAT programs, which 
gained notoriety from clashes with the Black Panthers and the 
Symbionese Liberation Army in the 1960s and 1970s, grew 
exponentially during the war-on-crime era of the ’80s and ’90s.251 
In addition to its domestic political aspects, the war on crime, and 
particularly Reagan’s war on drugs, had a geopolitical face that 
was no less ideological, political, and economic. Reagan’s—and 
later Bush’s—transnational drug interdiction program was 
intimately intertwined with Cold War-era politics in Latin 
America. It integrated military operations and domestic law 
enforcement both abroad and at home. 252  Surplus military 
equipment—a narrative of urban areas besieged by gangs and 
drugs—private ex-military contractors, and a glut of grants 
flowing from the government hastened the rapid militarization of 
domestic law enforcement.253 
SWAT and its military-style “raids” became normal in 
domestic policing, generating its own cultural iconography and 
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popular following. The SWAT team model filtered down to the 
smallest of local police departments. Balko explains: 
Logan, Utah, is a typical example of the phenomenon. As of 
2011, the city had just under 50,000 people, hadn’t had a 
murder in five years, and had recently been rated the “safest 
city in America.” Yet, since the mid-1980s, Logan has had its 
own SWAT team. What does a SWAT team do in a city with 
no violent crime? It creates violence out of nonviolent crime. 
“We haven’t really had a whole lot of barricaded subjects, and 
certainly we haven’t had an active gunman shooter,” a 
department spokesman told the local paper. . . . In the 
meantime, he said, it’s “mostly used for assistance on high-
risk search warrants”—“high-risk” meaning all or most drug 
warrants. “We’ve destroyed some doors over the years that 
maybe wouldn’t have gotten destroyed if there wasn’t a 
SWAT team, but it’s all in the name of trying to make a high-
risk situation more safe for everyone.”254 
The militarized violence of SWAT has become an ordinary facet of 
everyday crime interdiction, so much so that, until recently, the 
public rarely questioned the propriety of a kick-down-the-door raid 
when a “drug den” search was at issue. But upon even a second of 
reflection, a lay person can see the obvious: a bunch of heavily 
armed men storming a house in the middle of the night when 
people are likely to be home and startled is about the most 
dangerous way to execute a warrant. Moreover, hastily slapped 
together drug raids produce worse evidence than more time-
consuming investigative techniques, such as undercover 
operations and controlled buys.255 
In more candid moments, the police admit that the SWAT raid 
model is not a particularly safe or effective way to execute 
narcotics warrants. A former ICE agent and veteran of numerous 
SWAT narcotics, laundering, and human trafficking raids 
forthrightly told Balko, “The thing is, it’s so much safer to wait the 
suspect out.” He went on, “Waiting people out is just so much 
better. You’ve done your investigation, so you know their routine. 
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So you wait until the guy leaves, and you do a routine traffic stop 
and you arrest him.”256 
However, such sensible investigations do not have the allure 
to cops or the public of the image of SWAT officers—bedecked in 
authoritarian finery, using secretive hand signals and high-tech 
equipment to storm a Section 8 apartment like an ISIS bunker. 
One former narcotics officer confessed, “Oh, it’s a huge 
rush. . . . Those times when you do have to kick down a door, it’s 
just a big shot of adrenaline.”257 Another warned that violent drug 
interdiction could be addictive: “It’s a rush. And you have to be 
careful, because the raids themselves can be habit-forming.”258 In 
this sense, SWAT is more about masculine performance than self-
protection. As Angela Harris asserts, “If much of the violence of 
the criminal justice state emerges from state actors’ own needs to 
prove their masculinity rather than from the necessity of 
preventing and punishing crime, then the criminal justice state is, 
in this sense, a protection racket.”259 
The SWAT program serves the function of paying officers the 
nonmonetary wages of masculinist domination. In addition, home 
raids serve to strictly control the spatial and social place of people 
in bluelined neighborhoods. They function like the stop-and-frisk 
program designed by Commissioner Kelly to communicate to male 
New Yorkers of color that the police own the streets.260 SWAT 
raids, like “[m]any contemporary policing and punitive 
practices . . . communicate a racial and political, rather than 
moral, message—a message about who is in control and about who 
gets controlled,” in the words of theorist Bernard Harcourt. 261 
Frequent home raids tell residents that they do not even have 
sanctuary in the privacy of their “castles.” Police make it clear that 
they will not reserve violent SWAT tactics for the occasional high-
risk search but will use them at will to informally punish suspects 
in their homes. The existence of SWAT tells targeted residents 
that there is nowhere to hide. The Barton County, Kansas, Sherriff 
put out a public service announcement depicting a group of officers 
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in full riot gear and warning, “If you use drugs . . . [w]e make 
house calls.”262 
Figure 3. 
With militarization the norm, the police power to brutally 
maintain people in their “place” is at its zenith. Militarism is now 
an integral and critical part of how American policing dominates 
civilians, giving us the absurd sight of domestic law enforcers, clad 
in light tan camouflage designed for soldiers engaged in Middle 
East desert warfare, patrolling the humid city streets of downtown 
Portland. Balko laments that we have become “a country where it 
has become acceptable for armed government agents dressed in 
battle garb to storm private homes in the middle of the night—not 
to apprehend violent fugitives or thwart terrorist attacks, but to 
enforce laws against nonviolent, consensual activities.” He decries 
that “order is preserved by armed government agents too often 
conditioned to see streets and neighborhoods as battlefields and 
the citizens they serve as the enemy.”263 But this dystopian reality 
is not what we have become; it is the latest iteration of what has 
always been. 
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IV.  THE POISONED PROMISE OF PROSECUTION 
Racialized police brutality, from everyday mistreatment to 
highly publicized murders, takes an immense emotional and 
physical toll on the victims directly involved and the larger Black 
community. Many Black people harbor an intense desire to see 
officers who kill or harm civilians swiftly prosecuted, convicted, 
and imprisoned. In the aftermath of killings of innocents like 
Breonna Taylor, society demands the state hold wrongdoers 
accountable through prosecution and imprisonment.264 Professor 
Barbara Armacost observes, “People are dead and we thirst for 
justice. ‘Officers must be held accountable,’ we cry.”265 To be sure, 
crime victims of all kinds tend to equate justice with the 
incarceration of those who have wronged them. This “punitive 
impulse” is strong and compelling, but activists should bear in 
mind that criminal prosecution of individual bad-apple cops holds 
little promise of upending the structures that maintain policing as 
an institution of racial, social, and economic control.266 And an 
agenda myopically focused on individual criminal prosecution 
may, in fact, strengthen that institution. 
Proponents of cop prosecution as a means of reform make the 
facially intuitive argument that incarcerating individual officers 
will provide redress to victims and disincentivize brutality, 
thereby rendering the criminal system fairer and less violent.267 
Throughout time, progressive lawmakers and activists have 
sought to use criminal prosecution to fight injustices and, at the 
same time, balance the criminal system by making it more 
punitive toward Whites and more responsive to victims of color. 
Murakawa observes that “[t]he combination of a meager welfare 
state but a capacious carceral state ha[s] led interest groups to rely 
on criminal justice for social change.”268 Part of the explanation is 
that “reformers tend to build on or adapt existing institutional 
structures; destroying and building anew is costly, requires 
challeng[ing] entrenched interests, and poses coordination 
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problems.”269 And, as the controversy over the “defund the police” 
movement has shown, tearing down existing institutions, 
especially ones frequently touted as a public good, is a hard sell.270 
In my book, The Feminist War on Crime, I trace how the 
feminist antiviolence movement became entangled in carceral 
politics: 
In past decades, feminists were rightly concerned about 
gender violence, and they made philosophical and strategic 
choices about how to address it. These were hard choices. 
They were contested choices. They were choices under 
conditions of uncertainty, political pressure, and cultural 
change. But it becomes clear that powerful feminist 
subgroups repeatedly chose criminal law. Their reform 
agendas expanded police and prosecutorial power, 
emphasized criminals’ threat to vulnerable women, diverted 
scarce resources to law enforcement, and ultimately made 
many feminists soldiers in the late twentieth-century war on 
crime. . . . [F]eminism shaped the modern criminal system 
[just as] participation in the criminal system shaped modern 
feminism.271 
Of course, an extended discussion of the origins of American 
carceral feminism is not warranted here. Nevertheless, the 
carceral feminist story can serve as a cautionary tale for those who 
believe prosecuting officers should be a foremost goal of the Black 
Lives Matter and similar movements. 
Feminists and racial justice advocates often imagine it is 
possible to simultaneously pursue radical transformation of the 
penal system and selectively strengthen that system so that it can 
go after progressives’ identified privileged bad actors.272 However, 
the feminist story reveals the distributional reality that “carceral 
progressivism” rarely works this way.273  Feminists invested 
heavily and disproportionately in prosecuting individual men as a 
means to gender justice, but this program was no panacea: it 
harmed the many marginalized men who ended up jailed, landed 
some women in jail, did not always reduce—and sometimes 
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increased—violence, had the tendency to reinforce stereotypes 
about women, and perhaps most relevantly, thwarted the 
development of better methods of preventing and remedying 
violence against women.274 
Indeed, many equality-minded scholars believe that the penal 
system becomes more just when privileged parties—cops, White 
men, the wealthy—receive the same or harsher treatment than 
marginalized defendants. However, in seeking to ensure that the 
criminal law severely punishes apparently privileged defendants, 
progressive activists and lawmakers often propose reforms that 
expand the reach of substantive criminal laws, lengthen already 
exorbitant sentences, and add to prosecutors’ already enormous 
advantages in the criminal process.275 And, as I have said before, 
“Rich and powerful men have the corrupt influence to evade even 
toughened laws, placing the burden of increased criminalization 
on the poor minorities who form the policed segment of the 
population.”276 
Moreover, experiments to provide “equal protection under the 
carceral state” by ensuring that police, prosecutorial, and prison 
violence is equally inflicted on marginalized and privileged people 
alike have ended up as “one-way ratchets” that accrued to the 
penal state more power over everyone.277 Right-wing lawmakers 
justified deleterious policies like three-strikes and mandatory 
minimum laws on the ground that they decrease ostensibly racist 
judicial discretion and ensure defendants’ equal treatment. 278 
Perhaps the most sobering tale of such efforts involves the federal 
sentencing guidelines. In the 1980s, conservatives and liberals 
came together to address racial disparity in criminal sentencing, 
which they attributed to judicial discretion.279 Lawmakers quickly 
settled on rigid, mandatory federal sentencing guidelines, which 
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increased the length of sentences overall.280 It also turns out that 
lawmakers simply codified their “commonsense,” politically 
expedient, and inherently racialized notions of crime severity (i.e., 
crack dealing is worse than cocaine dealing).281 In the end, the 
guidelines created greater racial disparity.282 
Still, reformers cling to the fiction that policing and 
prosecution’s pathologies are the products of individual actors and 
their discretion. “At the core of liberal law-and-order was the 
promise to move each individual qua individual through a system 
of clear rules that allow little room for individual bias,” Murakawa 
notes.283 This legal agenda “legitimized extreme penal harm to 
African Americans: the more carceral machinery was rights-based 
and rule-bound, the more racial disparity was isolatable to ‘real’ 
black criminality.”284 Racial justice seekers’ perpetual hope that 
“reformed” criminal law and empowered prosecutors will lead to 
cop convictions that ultimately improve policing—and repeated 
disappointment and pain when it does not—is based on a 
misunderstanding of the relationship between law and police 
violence. Historically, criminal law enabled police violence, and 
currently it has little capacity to control it.285 
Consider, for example, the operation of law in the Breonna 
Taylor killing. Far from prohibiting deadly SWAT raids, the 
criminal law all but invites them.286 Courts and legislatures have 
encouraged the police to seek no-knock warrants and raid homes 
in the middle of the night based on the fiction that such brutality 
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is a necessary component of “inherently dangerous” drug 
interdiction.287 In short, the police who kill during drug raids are 
engaging in a style of search execution that has been explicitly 
approved by courts, including the Supreme Court.288 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has made clear that police may 
engage in this type of home raid even where there is marginal or 
no probable cause. In Illinois v. Gates, for example, the Court made 
it much easier for magistrates to approve of warrants based on the 
relatively unsubstantiated claims of informants. 289  The Court 
directed appellate courts to give “great deference” to “magistrate’s 
‘determination of probable cause’” and adopted a nebulous 
“totality-of-the-circumstances” test that freed magistrates to find 
probable cause without a strong showing that the informant was 
reliable.290 Justice Brennan dissented that these juridical moves 
undermined the constitutional principle “of having magistrates, 
rather than police, or informants, determine whether there is 
probable cause to support the issuance of a warrant.”291 Indeed, 
the Court has shown little concern over the “hydraulic pressures” 
that lead magistrates to rubber-stamp police requests for 
warrants. “Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law 
enforcement team,” the Court insisted in United States v. Leon, “as 
neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in the outcome of 
particular criminal prosecutions.”292 
In fact, however, judges regularly act more like partners to 
police than a check on them. Balko cites survey evidence that 
police widely “shop” for friendly magistrates and magistrates 
 
 287. See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 390 (1997) (citing People v. Lujan, 
484 P.2d 1238, 1241 (Colo. 1971)); 21 U.S.C. § 879 (authorizing execution of search warrants 
seeking controlled substances “at any time of the day or night”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-411 
(2020), https://nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/statutes.php?statute=29-411 [https://perma.cc 
/7SW3-SDQS] (allowing officer to enter a dwelling “without giving notice” if authorized by 
the judge or magistrate issuing the search warrant); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 224 
(2020), https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Law.aspx?d=112376 [https://perma.cc/VG7C-HB8F] 
(“The peace officer need not announce his authority and purpose when to do so would 
imperil the arrest.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-35-9 (2020), https://sdlegislature.gov/Statu 
tes/Codified_Laws/2049044 [https://perma.cc/WJ5N-5V6A] (allowing magistrate to issue 
no-knock warrant if notice would result in destruction of evidence or danger to officer or 
others). 
 288. See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 95–96, 100 (2005) (approving a SWAT 
drug raid where police, at gunpoint, intruded upon a sleeping resident, held her handcuffed 
in a garage for hours, and questioned her about her immigration status). 
 289. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241–45 (1983). 
 290. Id. at 230–31, 236 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969)). 
 291. Id. at 285 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 292. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 917 (1984). 
58 HOUS. L. REV. 867 (2021) 
924 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [58:4 
generally defer to the police on the need for a search.293 In the 
survey, “most police officers interviewed could not remember ever 
having been turned down.”294 One Denver Post report on warrant 
applications found that judges approved ninety-seven percent of 
no-knock warrant requests and noted that “astonishingly, many of 
the city’s judges would sign off on no-knock warrants even though 
the police hadn’t requested one.”295 In fact, “about 10 percent of the 
no-knock warrants were changed from knock-and-announce 
warrants merely by the judge’s signature.”296 And remember, as 
much as the law permits magistrates to defer to police on the need 
for raids, the law also defers to the police on how to execute the 
raid. SWAT teams using extreme levels of violence are simply 
officers making their Graham-approved “split-second judgments” 
that cannot be second guessed.297 Courts have created a virtual 
legal presumption that the inherent dangers of drug interdiction 
justify extreme violence, relieving narcotics raiders of the 
obligation to provide any particularized evidence that the brutal 
force was warranted. 
People are right to be outraged by the drug interdiction SWAT 
actions that culminated in Breonna Taylor’s untimely death. 
However, it would be a mistake to see these actions as aberrant, 
contrary to law, or a grave departure from “ordinary” drug 
interdiction. The hail of police bullets that killed Taylor was the 
final act of a formal, legally sanctioned police process all but 
designed to produce tragedy. We can start with the search warrant 
application. According to Detective Joshua Jaynes’s affidavit in 
support of the application, the only connection Taylor had to 
narcotics at all was that she happened to be friendly with the drug-
distribution suspect, Jamarcus Glover, and police had seen him 
leave her house on one occasion with a USPS package.298  The 
follow-up “investigation,” according to the affidavit, consisted 
solely of confirming with the postal inspector that Glover had 
previously received packages at Taylor’s house.299 
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That’s it. That was the information. There was no positive 
drug dog sniff of the package Glover left with. There was no 
controlled buy implicating Taylor. There were no observation post 
recordings of Taylor. There was no snitch—much less a reliable 
one—claiming Taylor was involved in drug dealing. Instead, what 
the affidavit contained was Jaynes’s speculation that “Glover may 
be keeping narcotics and/or proceeds” at Taylor’s house because “it 
is not uncommon for drug traffickers to receive mail packages at 
different locations.”300  Of course, there was no individualized 
information that such a dynamic was present in Taylor’s case. 
In fact, Jaynes later admitted that he left out that the officer 
who spoke to the post office inspector had “nonchalantly” told 
Jaynes that Glover “just gets Amazon or mail packages there.”301 
Why was Jaynes so wedded to his theory that Taylor must have 
been receiving drugs for Glover? He later detailed his chauvinist 
train of thought to internal investigators: “[Dealers] get other 
people involved and it’s usually females . . . . It’s usually baby 
mamas . . . or it’s girlfriends that they can trust. They can trust 
them with their money and their stuff.”302 So Jaynes “didn’t go too 
in-depth about [the Amazon remark] ’cause again, what I saw on 
my own two eyes.”303 
Clearly, Detective Jaynes, with his raced and gendered 
assumptions that female acquaintances are complicit “baby 
mamas,” was a poor guarantor of probable cause to search. But 
what about the judge, Judge Shaw? She says she’s “concerned” 
that Jaynes may have lied in the affidavit.304 Indeed, an officer told 
internal investigators that the postal inspector said Glover had not 
been receiving packages at Taylor’s house.305 But even if Judge 
Shaw had no reason to doubt the affidavit’s truth, how could she 
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possibly have approved of the police invading someone’s home, 
which even the most conservative members of the Supreme Court 
have recognized as the quintessential zone of personal privacy, in 
the face of such a stunning lack of probable cause?306 The simple 
answer is because she had no incentive to do otherwise. In 
Jefferson County, Kentucky, judges often hastily approve 
warrants, scribbling an illegible signature on them. “On the vast 
majority of search warrants—nearly 72%—the names of the 
judges who approved them were illegible.” 307  So much for the 
Supreme Court’s assurance in Leon of “judicial officers’ 
professional incentives to comply with the Fourth Amendment.”308 
Detective Jaynes’s ground for requesting that the warrant be 
“no-knock” was no less flimsy and conclusory. The affidavit states 
simply, “Affiant is requesting a No-Knock entry to the premises 
due to the nature of how these drug traffickers operate. These drug 
traffickers have a history of attempting to destroy evidence [and] 
have cameras on the location that compromise Detectives on[] 
approach to the dwelling.” 309  Notice, there was a lack of 
particularized information about the practice of the suspects, 
including Taylor, in this case. Notice also that Jaynes did not 
bother to claim that safety required a weapons-heavy, kick-down-
the-door type of entry. There was only his speculation that a drug 
dealer might destroy evidence in the time between knock and 
entry. And, if the issue was that Taylor might have a surveillance 
camera, the police could have confirmed that before the 
application. On the basis of this information, which did not include 
one iota of individualized evidence on Taylor or justifying the need 
for an intrusive entry into her home, “Judge Mary Shaw gave 
approval for five deadly no-knock warrants in 12 minutes in 
relation to the drug bust that Taylor had no involvement with, but 
which cost her life.”310 
Armed with a judicial mandate and plenty of long guns, the 
search team stormed Taylor’s home in the middle of the night. Of 
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course, if police were really concerned about potential for 
destruction of evidence, they would simply have waited for Taylor 
to leave her house during the day. This would have made 
particular sense, given that the police admitted they thought 
Taylor was a “soft target” who posed no danger and were not sure 
whether children or animals would be present on the night of the 
raid. 311  In the end, the police landed precisely where history, 
culture, typical practice, and the law put them—at Taylor’s 
doorstep, clad in military gear, and breathless to become “ruthless 
killers” at the first sign of a threat.312 At that point, it would have 
been surprising if the police raiders being shot at by Taylor’s 
boyfriend did not elicit a hail of bullets from them. 
Now, one might rejoin that if the drug raid practices that 
terrorize thousands of Americans are aided and abetted by law, 
law reform is the key to ending them. Perhaps an aggressive civil 
libertarian litigation strategy and lobbying effort could rein in 
some of the most egregious drug raid practices. To be sure, there 
have been successful efforts to limit no-knock and nighttime 
warrants.313 Judges are now feeling some counterpressure on the 
rubber-stamping front.314 Activists have been calling for local and 
state leaders to abandon SWAT programs, refuse military gear, 
and revise drug raid practices.315 However, these modest successes 
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come from social and political efforts, not litigation. In any case, a 
program to reform the laws and practices that underlie SWAT-
style drug interdiction practices is not the program of prosecuting 
select individual officers involved in these raids. 
The officers who killed Breonna Taylor, like many killer cops, 
are difficult to hold individually responsible precisely because they 
exercise official violence—violence that has long been accepted and 
even glorified by law and society. The individual criminal liability 
question is whether, at the moment of the killing, the officer 
reasonably feared deadly force.316 In the Taylor case, both killer 
officers were shot at and one was wounded, conferring on them a 
good individual claim of self-defense.317 Of course, the larger issue 
is that the Louisville police should not be in the business of 
invading people’s homes in the middle of the night and scaring 
them into shooting at police who they (rightly) believe are deadly 
intruders. Prosecuting individual officers who shoot back at scared 
home-defending residents, even if doing so results in conviction, is 
unlikely to change the practices that lead to such horrific results. 
In fact, it may reinforce them by propping up the fiction that 
extreme deadly violence is an aberration caused by deviant 
individuals and not a mainstay of narcotics policing.318 
Back in 2000, Angela Harris counseled that “ending pervasive 
police brutality requires not simply more punishment for ‘rogue’ 
officers or a greater commitment to the vague idea of ‘community 
policing,’ but rather a disruption of the entire gendered culture of 
policing.”319 Now, twenty years later, scholars like Armacost warn 
that “the current accountability paradigm—targeting the officer 
who pulled the trigger—is actually hindering genuine progress in 
decreasing the numbers of these tragedies, including those 
motivated by racism.”320  To be sure, the fact that racialized 
brutality is part of the very structure of American policing makes 
it unlikely that a singling out of a few sacrificial lambs, whom law 
professor Kate Levine warns will likely be minority cops or cops 
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who kill Whites,321 will have any meaningful impact on violence 
levels. 
Moreover, reforms intended to make it easier for prosecutors 
to convict hard-to-get cops are mostly not specific to police 
defendants and portend harm to the very marginalized criminal 
defendants whom reform is meant to benefit. In previous writings, 
I have argued that relatively privileged defendants do tend to 
benefit disproportionately from doctrines of leniency (broad 
defenses, sentencing discretion, diversion, etc.). However, ridding 
the law of such leniency has the effect of harming all defendants, 
the majority of whom are the worst off among us.322 Levine argues 
that the cop-prosecution program includes a laundry list of 
carceral, antidefendant laws and norms, many of “which have been 
clearly and persuasively shown to increase mass incarceration and 
to prop up the criminal legal system”: 
In reaction to officers not being charged, or not being 
convicted, many have turned to the techniques and tools that 
have been central to propping up mass incarceration: 
dehumanizing police defendants, suggesting new and 
harsher substantive criminal laws, eschewing procedural 
rights that contribute to fewer convictions, lamenting too 
short sentences for those officers who are convicted, 
lambasting prosecutors who are seen to excuse criminal 
behavior, and insisting upon treating police as harshly as 
civilians are treated.323 
In the wake of Breonna Taylor’s killing, many reformers have 
called for abolition, but not the abolition of policing, drug raids, or 
SWAT teams. They call for the abolition of grand juries.324 As a 
formal federal defender who practiced in a grand jury indictment 
system, I bristle at this proposal. Now, the grand jury is not much 
of a check—as goes the old adage, it would “indict a ham 
sandwich”—nevertheless, many defenders have stories of grand 
juries saving their clients from serious felony charges based on 
flimsy evidence. Accordingly, most defense attorneys would prefer 
that the law always require prosecutors—or better, defense 
 
 321. Levine, supra note 4 (manuscript at 38–39). 
 322. Race to Incarcerate, supra note 13, at 1006–07; Murder, Minority Victims, & 
Mercy, supra note 18, at 159–60; Aya Gruber, A Provocative Defense, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 
273, 309 (2015); Equal Protection, supra note 277, at 1365–66. 
 323. Levine, supra note 4 (manuscript at 7–9). 
 324. Dahleen Glanton, Column: Justice in Breonna Taylor’s Death Fell Victim to “Law-
and-Order” Politics, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/columns/d 
ahleen-glanton/ct-breonna-taylor-justice-20200924-xoxev3ywgrcq7bksehdzwlhj7q-story.ht 
ml [https://perma.cc/F3VV-HB66]. 
58 HOUS. L. REV. 867 (2021) 
930 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [58:4 
attorneys—to present defenses and exculpatory evidence to grand 
jurors. 325  In a similar vein, after deadly police shootings, 
commentators regularly call for revisions to the substantive 
criminal law to make it harder for anyone to claim self-defense.326 
I have previously shown how such reforms impact men of color who 
constitute the bulk of homicide defendants.327 
However, my main concern with the cop-prosecution program 
is not distributional. It is possible that reforms that put pressure 
on prosecutors to charge killer officers and create proconviction 
rules will not disadvantage noncop defendants. It is possible that 
they will not disproportionately jail rookie minority officers. 
Experiences with other carceral progressive programs and recent 
research of police prosecutions indicate otherwise, but it could be 
that the cop-prosecution program will just incarcerate bad cops 
without spillover effects. But my primary critique is that focusing 
on the individual criminal liability of officers, like other 
incremental reform programs, reinforces the dominant narrative 
that racialized brutality is a failure of policing. Worse, it portrays 
this failure as a matter of individual rogue actors. At this moment 
in time, it is critical for progressive scholars and activists to stop 
describing policing as a crime-fighting institution with some 
fixable problems and find a new “language.”328 
The idea that policing is the state program that provides 
community safety is so naturalized that people of color residing in 
the bluelined communities—even people who have experienced 
police violence themselves—often support more, not less, policing. 
To be sure, there is a long history of scholars, activists, and 
residents alike characterizing the crime, poverty, and 
destabilization in marginalized neighborhoods as a function of 
“underpolicing.” 329  However, as Professor Monica Bell notes, 
“Sociologists studying poverty and community life have long 
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provided evidence that even when people rely on each other to 
survive poverty and social marginality, those relationships are 
generally not sanguine, trusting relationships. Those 
relationships are often unstable and destabilizing.”330 For sure, 
few residents of socially and economically precarious 
neighborhoods endorse heavy police presence for its own sake. 
They endorse it on the presumption that the police will solve or 
improve the environmental problems that concern them.331 
Policing has successfully occupied so many parts of American life, 
but perhaps its most stunning success has been the occupation of 
the American imagination.332 We have yet to develop a consistent 
vocabulary for the state provision of security services that does not 
invoke “the police.” 
Analyzing policing from an institutional perspective—viewing 
it as a fixed institution of race, class, and gender domination that 
maintains geographic totalitarianism and sustains itself through 
a monopoly on violence—upends the notion that we can transform 
the police into an egalitarian security provider. Liberal theorists 
and lawyers have largely adopted an institutional perspective 
regarding capital punishment, leading most to embrace abolition 
over trying to racially equalize the application of capital 
punishment.333 Empirical studies have shown that the racial bias 
in capital punishment relates to victims, that is, capital 
punishment is far more likely when victims are White than when 
they are Black.334  Accordingly, some argue that Black victims’ 
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family members are deprived the “closure” of a death sentence.335 
Progressives, however, have for the most part rejected the 
argument that capital punishment can be fixed by distributing the 
death “benefit” equally to Black and White families.336 They reject 
that deadly punishment is a “good” to be doled out fairly and 
instead “look at capital punishment institutionally—its 
philosophical groundings, its larger effects on subordinated groups 
and communities, and its place within an evolved global 
civilization.”337 For institutionalists, disparities in executions are 
not fixable but serve to “confirm the morally fraught nature of the 
entire capital punishment enterprise.”338 
We can take such an institutional view of policing, if not the 
entire penal system. As an institution of violent domination, 
policing cannot be reformed from within, and we should not 
expend more resources on reforming it. In 2020, two Washington 
Post reporters examined the five-year fallout from Baltimore’s 
efforts to reform its police force beginning in 2015 after the death 
of Freddie Gray. The reporters found that the end result was that 
the police budget increased, even as police spent less time making 
arrests for minor crimes (a good thing) and less time attempting 
to solve major crimes like murders (a bad thing). In addition, 
plain-clothed officers stepped up their harassment and 
intimidation tactics, and police claimed ransom-like levels of 
overtime. The journalists’ research led to the conclusion that 
crime-fighting “failures” are the police’s bread and butter: 
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Police departments, strengthened by their own problems, 
have no incentive to actually change. It is hard to imagine 
another agency that could use such an abysmal failure as a 
sign of its necessity. Police will never give up power 
voluntarily—so it must be taken from them by significantly 
defunding police departments and reallocating the money in 
ways that might actually curb violence and offer resources to 
communities terrorized by police. 
 Police don’t believe in reform. Baltimore shows that we 
shouldn’t, either.339 
Such an institutional critique of policing, and the entire 
carceral state, is a mainstay of abolitionist ideology, which is 
currently experiencing a renaissance in progressive scholarly 
circles. Dorothy Roberts describes prison abolitionist thought: 
Efforts to fix the criminal punishment system to make it 
fairer or more inclusive are inadequate or even harmful 
because the system’s repressive outcomes don’t result from 
any systemic malfunction. Rather, the prison industrial 
complex works effectively to contain and control black 
communities as a result of its structural design. Therefore, 
reforms that correct problems perceived as aberrational 
flaws in the system only help to legitimize and strengthen its 
operation. Indeed, reforming prisons results in more 
prisons.340 
Recognizing that internal reforms and “alternative[]” programs 
“become add-ons to the prison solution,” abolitionists like Thomas 
Mathiesen warn that activists should support only “‘negative’ 
reforms” that “strive towards ‘shrinking’ the system.”341 Similarly, 
the contemporary abolitionist group Critical Resistance draws a 
strict distinction between “reformist reforms” that “continue or 
expand the reach of policing”—prosecuting cops, expensive body 
cams, more money for training—and “abolitionists steps” that 
“chip away” at the penal state—refusing military equipment, 
reducing police size, investing in housing and services.342 Professor 
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Scott Holmes, for example, recognizes that “[b]ecause police have 
played the role of enforcing social control of poor people of color, it 
will be difficult to reorient this aspect of policing.”343 However, he 
adds: 
Until then it is important to strategically negotiate aspects 
and terms of this social control to make encounters safer and 
[fairer]. This might include minimizing contact between 
police and poor people of color by deprioritizing enforcement 
of laws which are used to target poor people of color. 
Ordinances, which deprioritize marijuana where there are 
racial disparities in marijuana enforcement, offer an 
example. Also, agencies which stop issuing charges for tail 
lights, tinted windows, and other non-safety traffic violations 
have the effect of reducing racially discriminatory [stops].344 
Let me indulge a somewhat odd analogy and posit that 
policing is like the coal industry. It is an institution that needs to 
be phased out in favor of better, less costly methods of providing 
necessary services. Policing cannot claim a monopoly on 
provisioning safety any more than coal can claim a monopoly on 
provisioning energy. Policing cannot be divorced from racialized 
violence any more than the coal industry can be divorced from coal 
mining. Policing cannot be cleaned up any more than coal can be 
sanitized simply by affixing a “clean” label to it. However, the fact 
of the matter is that policing, even more so than King Coal, is a 
deeply entrenched facet of American life involving real people’s 
real lives. Concerned residents, without any alternative, rely on 
the police for safety, services, and crime-solving. Employees within 
police departments rely on their salaries to survive. Policing 
cannot and probably should not disappear overnight.345 
Still, clean energy has taken decades to gain ground and will 
take many more to become the norm. The move away from policing 
toward other means of providing safety, services, and crime-
solving will come in fits and starts. Nevertheless, incremental, 
“negative,” and “transformative” reforms are already occurring. 
Consider, for example, the aftermath of the Floyd litigation in New 
York City. The courts did not have the capacity to rein in policing, 
but politics did. Mayor Bill DeBlasio came into office with a 
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promise to reform the police, and with the stroke of a pen, he 
essentially ended stop and frisk.346 Stop and frisks went from a 
high of approximately 686,000 in 2011 down to roughly 11,000 in 
2017, a ninety-eight percent decrease.347 Far from the city lapsing 
into anarchy, New York’s 2017 crime rate was seventeen percent 
lower than its rate in 2011.348 Already, cities across the nation are 
making moves to replace the police with nonpolice crisis 
intervenors for certain emergency situations.349  Already, there 
have been bipartisan federal efforts to end the pipeline of military 
weapons from the federal government to states and local police 
forces.350  A critical step in furthering all these and even more 
ambitious changes is a shift away from the American imaginary 
that the purpose of policing is crime-fighting. Scholars and 
activists must resist this mythology that has been so relentlessly 
fed to the public for decades and unwaveringly insist that policing 
is an archaic, hierarchy-preserving institution whose phase-out is 
long past due. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This is a moment of radical awareness in which people of all 
races and socioeconomic statuses are decrying the brutality of 
street policing and lamenting that the United States has the 
ignoble distinction of the most punitive nation on Earth. This 
moment requires activists, scholars, and reform-minded 
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policymakers to keep up the pressure even as the twenty-four-hour 
news cycle moves on and to call for much more than the 
prosecution of individual officers. This moment necessitates the 
rejection of policing’s organizational structures and tactics that 
are rooted in slavery, disciplining the poor and lower classes, and 
suppressing workers’ demands for rights. This moment demands 
nothing less than a total reimagination of how the state can justly, 
fairly, and effectively serve and protect individuals and 
communities. We can make real strides and ensure that six-year-
old Gianna Floyd spoke truth when she said, “Daddy changed the 
world.”351 
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